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APPENDIX G 
" PART 2 
A'OLLOS'ACICRA,f 
The spacecraft (SIC) consiSIs of a,lallnch t'Scapt' system (LES) allem­
bly. command modllle (C/M), service modale (S/NI). and the spacecraftl 
lunar modllie adapter (SLA). The LES ass~mbly provides tM _ans for 
rapidly separatin~ tM CIM from Ihe S/NI darilll pad or svborbital aborts. 
The ciM forms the spacecraft control cenier. contains Ilt'cellary aDto­
mali<' and manul equip!llt'nl to control and manitor tM spacecraft 
Ilystems. and conlains Ihe required equiplllt'lll for safely and comfort 01 
tht' Cft'W; Tht' S/M is a cylindrical Slrll,llIre localt'd bet_ell tbe CIM 
and lhe SU•. It conlains Iht' proplllsion systt'ms for allitllde and ye loc­
ity chanlile maneu\"ers. Mosi of the COIlsvrnables lI!led in the milliOil are 
stored, ill the S/M. =Tht' SU is a truncated cOIle wIIich COlllM!cts tbe 
S/M to tht' launch \'t'hicJe. II also prO\"ides tht' space wIIertin Ihe IDliar 
module (LIM) is carrit'd on lunar missions. 
TlST 1M 'ROGUSS AT TIMI 0' ACCIDIMT 
Spacecrafl 012 ""as undergoing a "Plugs 0.1 Integratt'd Test" at tbe 
ti_ of Iht' acridenl on Janury 27. 1967. Opt'ratiOilal Checkout Proce· 
dure. dt'Sijl{Daled OCP ."O-K·OO'.U·I applied 10 this tesl. Within tbis 
reporl this ",oct'dare is often referred 10 all OCP-OG21. 
TlSTS AMD ANALYSIS 
Results of tt'SIS and analyst'S nor complele al Ihe li_ 01 pttblicatiOll 
of this repott will be conla ined in APpt'ndix G. Addenda and Cortilenda. 
COMY,IRSIOM 0' TIMI 
Throvgholll Ihls reporl. li_ I. slatt'd in Greenwich Mean Ti_ (GMT). 
TocOIlvert GMT to Eastern Standard Ti_ (EST). svbtract 17 hour•• 
For example. 2S:U GMT (Ollyerted is8:'1 ,.Ift. EST. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD ACTIVITIES SUBSEQUENT TO 
THE LAST GENERAL SESSION OF MARCH 31, 1967 
April 1 - 2, 1967 
The Board Members and Counsel to the Board began the final draft 
of the Board's Report to the Administrator. 
April 3 - 8, 1967 
The Board Members and Counsel to the .Board reviewed, and cor­
rected as necessary, the final drafts of all the Panel Reports 
to be included in the Board's Report. The Report to the Adminis­
trator was completed noon, April 8, 1967. 
April 5, 1967 
The Hon. George P. Miller, Chairman, Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, House of Representatives, met briefly with the 
Chairman of the Apollo 204 Review Board and was introduced to 
the Members of the Board and Counsel. Colonel Frank Borman was 
asked by the Chairman to escort Mr. Miller in the Display Area 
in the Pyrotechnics Installation Building, KSC. 
April 8, 1967 
At 3 p.m. Board Members (less Colonel Borman) and Board Counsel 
departed KSC for LRC. 
April 9, 1967 
The Board Members (less Colonel Borman and White) and Board 
Counsel departed LRC for NASA Headquarters. At 4 p.m. the entire 
Board and Counsel met with the Administrator, the Deputy Adminis­
trator, the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, the 
Apollo Program Office and the Functional Managers of NASA Head­
quarters. The Board explained its findings, determinations and 
recommendations to the Admini$trator and to other members of 
NASA Headquarters. 
Also on this date delivery of the Report was made to the Admin­
istrator, less Appendices D 1-4, D 6-10. 
April 10, 1967 
The Apollo 204 Review Board testified before the Subcommittee 
on NASA Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Astro­
nautics in morning, afternoon and evening sessions. Appendices 
D 1-4 and D 6-10 were delivered to the Administrator. 
April 11, 1967 
The Apollo 204 Review Board testified before the Senate Committee 
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences in morning and afternoon 
sessions. Following that testimony the Board convened in the 
Management Review Center, NASA Headquarters, to review and edit 
the transcript of the House Hearings conducted on April 10. 
April12, 1967 
The Board convened in the Management Review Center, NASA Head­
quarters, to review and edit the transcripts of the Senate 
Hearings conducted on April 11. At twelve noon, the Board was 
recessed by the Chairman subject to being reconvened at the 
call of the Chairman, and the Members returned to their respec­
tive offices to resume their normal duties. 
April 142 1967 
The Chairman by TWX delegated Board Member Colonel Frank Borman 
to act in the Chairman's behalf when the Subcommittee on NASA 
Oversight visited KSC on April 21, 1967. Preparation of errata 
sheets to the Report began. 
April 18, 1967 
The errata sheets were completed and delivered to NASA Head­
quarters. The first shipment of official Board files was sent 
from KSC to LRC. 
April 21, 1967 
The Subcommittee on NASA Oversight of the House Committee on 
Science and Astronautics visited KSC. The following members 
were in attendance: Congressmen Teague, Hechler, Daddario, 
Fulton, Gurney, Wyd1er, Vander Jagt. Subcommittee Staff Members 
in attendance were: Messrs. Ducander, Gerardi, Wilson. Dr. 
Mueller was represented by Messrs. Freitag and Holcomb; Mr. 
Callaghan was represented by Mr. Cramer. After visiting LC 34 
and the VAB, the Subcommittee spent approximately one hour in 
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the PIB. Board Member Colonel Frank Borman conducted the brief­
ing held in the PIB. At the request of Chairman Teague the 
Subcommittee viewed a display of the astronauts' suits in Room 
106 of the PIB. Following luncheon in the KSC Director's con­
ference room, the Subcommittee (and various members of NASA 
Management) convened in Room 1814 MSOB to hear the last six 
minutes (approximately) of the S-Band voice transmission prior 
to and at the time of the accident. Colonel Frank Borman pro­
vided necessary explanations of sounds and answered questions.
At the conclusion of this session (approximately fifteen minutes 
duration) the Subcommittee began open hearings in the Mission 
Briefing Room, MSOB. The Subcommittee departed KSC at 3:30 p.m. 
April 25, 1967 
Shipment of the rema1n1ng Official Board Files, including the 
Photo Library Files, to LRC from KSC was accomplished. 
May 9 - 10, 1967 
The Chairman, at the request of the Administrator, attended the 
hearings before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight on May 9 and 
the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee on May 10 
covering the response of the Administrator and the Apollo Pro­
gram Management to the Board's Report. 
May 12 - 16, 1967 
By TWX dated May 12, 1967, the Chairman appointed a subcommittee 
to examine the final report of Panel 18 and prepare recommenda­
tions regarding its acceptability for inclusion in Appendix G 
of the Board's Report. The membership of the subcommittee con­
sisted of: 
Dr. Maxime A. Faget, Chairman 
Colonel Frank Borman 
Mr. George C. White, Jr. 
Mr. E. Barton Geer 
The subcommittee was also requested to review the comments of 
the North American Aviation, Inc. relative to the validity of 
the findings, determinations and recommendations of the Board 
and its Panels. The subcommittee met at Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, on May 16, 1967, and after review of the Panel 
18 reports, recommended that they be accepted by the Board; and 
secondly, after review of the comments of North American Aviation, 
advised the Chairman that none of the Board's or Panel's findings,
determinations and recommendations need be withdrawn or modified. 
May 22, 1967 
The Chairman, in a telephone conversation with Dr. Robert W. 
Van Do1ah, briefed him on the progress of completion of the 
work of the -Board, particularly with regard to the acceptance 
of the final reports of Panel 18 to be published in Appendix
G. The Chairman advised Dr. Van Do1ah that, with the concur­
rence of all Board Members, he will advise Dr. Seamans by letter 
that the work of the Board has been completed and request that 
the Board be dissolved. 
May 23, 1967 
The Chairman, in a telephone conversation with Colonel Charles 
F. Strang and John J. Williams briefed each of them on the 
progress of completion of the work of the Board particularly
with regard to the acceptance of the final reports of Panel 18 
to be published in Appendix G. The Chairman advised Colonel 
Strang and John Williams that, with the concurrence of all 
Board Members, he will advise Dr. Seamans by letter that the 
work of the Board has been completed and request that the 
Board be dissolved. 
May 24, 1967 
The materials in the Official Board's File at Langley Research 
Center are being indexed and catalogued. It is anticipated 
that this will be accomplished by the end of June 1967. 
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I. 	 CHRONOLOGY OF CORRESPONDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE 
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES COMMITTEE, UNITED 
STATES SENATE 
On April 14, 1967, the Chairman of the Apollo 204 
Review Board addressed a letter to the Chairman, Aeronautical 
and Space Sciences Committee, United States Senate answering 
a request from Senator Smith to submit for the record the 
Chairman's own opinion as to where the NASA's management 
structure the major deficiency lies with respect to the 
failure to recognize and to correct the serious deficiencies 
noted in the Board's Report. Attachment 1 is the letter to 
the Committee in response to that r.equest. 
Another request by Senator Smith was for the Board to 
submit to the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Committee 
a summary of the report furnished to the Board by a former 
North American Aviation, Inc. employee, Thomas R. Baron. The 
requested summary was furnished the Committee by letter dated 
April 18, 1967, with enclosure, Attachment 2. 
At .the end of the Hearings held on April 11, the Com­
mittee Staff Director requested the Counsel to the Board 
to furnish him the organizational structure of North American 
Aviation. This was furnished by letter dated April 18, 1967, 
Attachment 3. 
These three submittals constitute all the submissions 
requested by the Senate Committee for inclusion in the 
record of the Hearings. 
II. 	 CHRONOLOGY OF CORRESPONDENCE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE 
ON NASA OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
In response to requests by Congressman Ryan to submit 
correspondence from the Safety Office, Kennedy Space Center, 
pertaining to timely submittals of operational checkout pro­
cedures for review, the requested correspondence was sub­
mitted to the Chairman by letter dated April 19, 1967, 
Attachment 4. 
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The letter transmitting the correspondence requested by
Congressman Ryan for the record also furnished data requested
by Congressman Winn with respect to the time lag ·in recording
Engineering orders, Attachment 4. 
During the course of the Hearings before the Subcommittee, 
Congressman Fulton desired that the previous history of 
electrical arcing be put in the record and also what the infer­
ences and responses were from that history. By letter dated 
April 19, 1967, Counsel to the Review Board furnished the 
Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs the requested
history with a letter of transmittal to the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee signed by the Chairman of the Review Board, 
Attachment S. 
During the Hearings held on April 10, 1967, Congressman
Rumsfe1d requested the Board to submit information as to who 
was responsible for the various elements of ground emergency
procedures that were stated in the Findings and Determi­
nations on Pages D-13-11 to D-13-13 of Appendix D to the 
Board's Report. By letter dated April 27, 1967, the Chair­
man of the Apollo 204 Review Board transmitted the requested
information to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on NASA Over­
sight. This letter was transmitted to NASA Headquarters,
Code C by the Counsel of the Review Board on April 27, 1967, 
Attachment 6. 
These three submittals constitute all the submissions 
requested by the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight for inclusion 
in the record of the Hearings. 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
April 14, 1967 
IN REPLY REFER TO 
Honorable Clinton P. Anderson 
Chairman, Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 
Dear Senator Anderson: 
During hearings held on April 11, 1967, before your Committee, 
Senator Smith asked me to submit for the record m:y own opinion 
as to where in NASA's management structure the major deficiency 
lies with respect to the failure to recognize and to correct the 
serious deficiencies noted in the Board's report. 
In m:y opinion, the overall organization structure of the Apollo. 
program, both Government and Contractor, is sound. What I, 
personally, and the other Board members were concerned about 
were the procurement/inspection/checkout/acceptance processes 
of Apollo spacecraft at lower levels of management. I felt that 
this was a weakness within the structure that should be looked 
into by the top management of NASA. The accomplisbment of 
this objective must face the difficulties of dealing with the dynamic 
requirements of a fast moving program. When you consider that 
two NASA Centers, Manned Spacecraft Center and Kennedy Spacecraft 
Center, and two Contractor facilities, North American Aviation, 
Downey and North American Aviation, Florida facility must, of 
necessity, coordinate the total effort, it is not difficult to 
discover areas where the administrative, engineering, and opera­
tional procedures may show defects. 
The Board described the management and organization of the 
Apollo program in Appendix E of its report to the Administrator, 
NASA. In its report, the Board set out in considerable detail 
the management and responsibility levels. However, no attempt 
was made to ascertain the actual working relationships as they 
currently exist between the various management levels. The 
Board did not consider itsel~ to be charged with the responsibility 
of management analysis. Furthermore, i~ it had, the investigation 
would have taken several more months. 
I~ any management level is to be charged with the failure to recognize 
and correct the de~iciencies noted in the Board's report, it would 
be the design and layout engineering level. I pointed out in my 
testimony and it is a matter o~ record that the Board and I were 
seriously concerned with the electrical wiring and soldered 
joints. I speci~ied the material to you in my testimony and 
re~erred you to page 6 o~ Appendix D-9 o~ the Report. I believe 
that when the wiring and plumbing joint problem is solved by the 
Apollo Program O~~ice, coupled with the recommended reduction 
of ~lammable material, the reliability o~ the Apollo spacecraft 
will be increased to an acceptable level not only ~or safety, but 
foc mission success. 
Sincerely yours, 
Original signed by 
Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
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April 18, 1967 
Honorable Clinton P. Anderson 
Chairman, Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 
Dear Senator Anderson: 
During the hearings held on April 11, 1967, before your 
Committee, Senator Smith asked me if I would be able to 
get a summary of Baron t s report and give it to the Com­
mittee. I assured Senator Smith that I wculd. Attachment 
No. 1 is the 'requested summary. 
Sincerely yours, 
Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 
Review Board 
Enclosure 
~~~:scw 4-18-67 
G-15 

ATTACIIMElNT NO.1 
During the course of the Apollo 204 Review Board investigation, 
a 58-page document called "An Apollo Report" was furnished to 
the Board by a :Mr. Thomas R. Baron, a former North American 
Aviation, Inc., Quality Control Inspector and Receiving Inspec­
tion Clerk. This document was severely critical of North 
American Avi~ion's conduct of the Apollo project. :Mr. Baron 
was requested to testify to the Board about his allegations 
which he did on February 7, 1967. In addition, he furnished 
a 275-page document entitled "The Baron· Report. II The testi­
mony before the Board and the 275-page document reiterated and 
set out in more detail the allegations originally made against 
North American Aviation, Inc., in the 58-page document. 
The criticisms levied by :Mr. Baron at his former employer, North 
American Aviation, Inc., can be grouped into five (5) categories: 
(1) quality control, (2) safety, (3) records and documentation, 
(4) personnel, and (5) operations. These allegations are sum­
marizedin the following: . 
1. QUALITY CONTROL: 
Throughout the report, allegations are made of generally 
poor workmanship observed by Baron. Because of faulty quality 
control procedures, unacceptable workmanship was often missed 
by inspectors. When he himself observed defects which he was 
unwilling to pass, Baron would report these to his supervisors. 
The report details various instances where nothing was done to 
correct the deficiencies he noted. Specific examples of poor 
quality workmanship discussed in the report are faulty installa­
tion of spacecraft 012 heat shield; faulty installation of space­
craft 009 rendezvous window; poor workmanship in splicing on 
the quads; and unsatisfactory water glycol operations in ground 
support. 
The report is also critical of test and inspection procedures, 
alleging that tests were frequently conducted by unqualified 
personnel using equipment not suited for the particular test 
being conducted. The failure of NASA personnel to participate 
in many of these tests and to maintain a general cognizance of 
the daily workings on the project has, in Baron's opinion, made 
such lax procedures possible. 
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2 • SAFETY : 
Baron alleges that the general level of safety on the 
project site was low. Lack of sufficient standards was a 
factor, which together with supervisory and employee care­
lessness contributed to the hazards he observed in the 
operations. .Among the particular hazards he details are 
permitting smoking during and immediately after hazardous 
operations; conducting fuel operations to diesel power unit 
when oxidizer transfer unit operation was being conducted; 
leaving open drains at various levels of pad 34; absence of 
nets and chain rails to safeguard men working at different 
levels of the gantry; nonoperating elevators for emergency 
egress; falling objects endangering personnel on the ground; 
and operating of high pressure valves without proper protection. 
3. RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION: 
In several areas, there are no procedures established 
for uniform record keeping. Where records are maintained, 
they vary from technicians notes to standard printed forms. 
Because of this lack of uniformity, it is possible to initiate 
relatively major alterations on the systems without these 
alterations ever being documented for future reference. An 
example of this situation is seen in the removal and replace­
ment of parts in the coolant system without proper documentation. 
Where record keeping procedures are fairly well established, 
the procedures are often grossly inefficient. Parts distribution 
is an example of this inefficiency. Forms used for this are 
printed in two copies. One copy is torn off and thrown away 
without ever being used. 
4. PERSONNEL: 
Personnel working on the project are shifted from one job 
to another before acquiring extensive familiarization with the 
particular project on which they are working. This prevents 
technicians from becoming IIprofessional" and hinders their 
opportunities for advancement in the company. 
Personnel control is generally poor; technicians at times 
standing around with nothing to do, while at other times, there 
was a lack of technicians for a given task. Work that should 
have been done by experienced mechanics was done by NASA Quality 
Control personnel and engineers would from time to time perform 
functions that the technicians should have been performing. 
Sane phases of the work were jjnproperly supervised, there being 
no qualified engineer on the project site. 
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These and several other personnel problems contributed to 
the lowering of morale among North American Aviation emplqyees 
and a resultant reduction of efficiency. 
5. OPERATIONS: 
The Baron Report alleges a "Lack of coordination between 
people in responsible positions" and a "lack of communication 
between almost everyone. II More specifically, he alleges a 
failure to provide official tie in periods for work; scheduling 
of work in areas so nearby as to cause almost certain contamina­
tion; and difficulty in determining whether meter calibrations 
are up to date. 
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April 18, 1967 
James J. Gehrig, Esq. 
staff Director, Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee 
Roam 231, Senate Office Building 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 
Dear Jim: 
Transmitted herewith is the North American Aviation, Inc., 
organizational structure together with a brief narrative of 
the organization and management of the Apollo Ccmmand and 
Service Module Program. I finally received the package at 
1:20 p.m. I hope you get it in time for the Ccmmittee print. 
Sincerely yours, 
George T. Malley 
Counsel, Apollo 204 Review Board 
Enclosure 
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DIRECTION AND CONTroL OF 

APOLLO COMMAND-SERVICE MOllJLE (CSM) PROGRAM 

I. Organization and Management of Apollo CSM Program 
North American Aviation (NAA), by the nature of its organization 
and the policy of its management, makes available to the customer the 
full resources of the canpany in support of the Apollo CSM Program. 
Program management has been assigned to direct and control the Program 
to satisfy customer technical, schedule, and cost requirements. 
A. Corporation 
The Space and Information Systems Divison (s&ID), which is 
responsible for the Apollo CSM and Saturn II Programs is one of 
seven NAA operating divisions supported by corporation administra­
tive organizations. Each division is headed by a division president 
who is also a vice president of the corporation responsible to BAA 
President, J. L. Atwood. Mr. Atwood is also Chairman of NAA' s 
Board of Directors. The corporation establishes and administers 
the broad policies which constitute the framework within which each 
operating division functions. Chart "X" shows the NAAcorporate 
organization. 
B. s&ID 
s&ID is headed by Division President, H. A. Stoms. This 
division is responsible for the Apollo CSM and Saturn II Programs 
which are being carried out under separate program managers. The 
Apollo CSM Program is directed by Apollo CSM Program Manager and 
s&ID Vice President, D. D. Myers, who is responsible to both NASA 
and Division PreSident, H. A. Stonns. Advanced Programs Develop­
ment, and. Research, Engineering and Test furnish special technical 
support as needed. otrer s&ID functions provide administrative 
support - Chart "z" shows the s&.ID organization. 
C. Apollo CSM 
As shown in Chart "L, II the Apollo CSM Program Manager, 
D. D. Myers, is assisted by Deputy Program Manager, C. H. Feltz, 
and four Assistant Program Managers. Directors of four functional 
areas report directly to the Program Manager. The Director of 
Quality and Reliability Assurance is responsible to the Program 
Manager in technical matters although reporting administratively 
to the s&ID Director of Quality and Reliability Assurance. The 
Director of Apollo CSM Operations, Florida, J. L. Pearce, is 
responsible to the Apollo CSM Program Manager although he reports 
administratively to the NAA General Manager of the Florida Facility, 
W. S. Ford. This organizational plan gives the Apollq CSM Program 
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Manager direct control and responsiblity over all phases of the 
Program including all subcontracting, which is administered by 
Apollo material. 
D. Florida Facility 
The overall Florida Facility organization is shown in 
Chart "Q," and the Apollo CSM Florida organization, in Chart "E." 
The Apollo CSM Florida Director, J. L. Pearce, is supported by 
three managers, the Chief Project Engineer, R. W. Pyle, and the 
Technical Support Chief, R. E. Franzen. The three managers have 
separate areas of responsibility: Test Operations, J. M. Moore; 
Test Sites, R. E. Barton; and Quality and Reliability Assurance, 
J. L. Hansel. Very close liaison and control between Downey and 
Florida Apollo CSM operations is maintained. 
II. Program Hardware Responsibility 
s&ID is responsible, with NASA concurrenc~ for the overall develop­
ment, design, manufacture, and test of Apollo CSM hardware. 
A. §$>acecraft Conf'iguration 
The Apollo CSM configuration is shown in Chart ZZ. s&.ID is 
responsible for the command and service modules, the launch escape 
system, the spacecraft/lunar module adapter, and most subsystems 
pertaining to these modules. s&ID is responsible for coordinating 
the physical and operating interfaces of these modules and systems 
with the Associate Contractors (shown in Chart LC), and NASA. 
B. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) 
NAA supplies GSE as directed by NASA to support Apollo CSM test 
and checkout operations at all test sites. This GSE consists of 
checkout equipment, auxiliary equipment, servicing, and handling 
equipment. NAA is responsible for the design, manufacture, and 
checkout of this GSE. 
C. Subsystems 
The following Apollo CSM subsystems and modules are being pro­
duced inhouse at NAA: 
Subsystem or Module Division 
Command and Service Modules (Complete) s&.ID 
SLA (Complete) s&.ID 
Launch Escape System Structure Los Angeles DiVision 
Sequencer System Autonetics 
Command Module Reaction Control System Rocketdyne 
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Units that are made at other NAA divisions are designed, manu­
factured, and tested under s&ID supervision and control. 
D. 	 Subcontractors 
Major and minor subcontractors are selected with NASA concurrence 
by s&ID, and are under SUD surveillance. The subsystems they 
are designed, manufactured, and tested under s&..ID supervision and 
control. Chart R shows the Apollo CSM major subcontractors and the 
systems for which each is responsible. 
E. 	 Suppliers 
s&ID buys hardware for the Apollo CSM Program directly from over 
12,000 first-tier suppliers of which 9,600 represent small business; 
and the remainder, large business. All such hardware must be 
bought fram s&rD approved sources and the hardware must be certified 
and tested as required to meet applicable specifications. Suppliers 
of these first-tier suppliers represent many thousands of additional 
firms. 
III. Program Control Procedures 
A. 	 The baseline for NASA and NAA management of the program is contained 
in the contract. The particular control baselines are the technical, 
master end item and specific end item specifications, the contract 
plans, and contract change notices which became incorporated into 
the baselines by specification and supplemental agreements. The 
controlling plans are the Manufacturing Plan, the Quality Control 
Plan, the Configuration Management Plan, the Ground Operations 
Requirement Plan and the Reliability Plan. 
B. 	 Control Tools - Cost, Schedule and Quality 
Program control procedures are implemented only after formal 
Joint NASA/NAA interface agreements. These interfaces consist of 
contractual, technical and schedule meetings and documentation. 
Contractual direction is given by NASA to NAA through (bilateral) 
Supplemental Agreements and Contract speCification Change Notices 
and through (unilateral, by NASA) Contract Change Authorizations, 
Technical direction is given by NASA through Program Management 
Meetings, letters and wires to the NAA contracting officer and in 
formal reviews and Interface Control Documents. Formal joint 
reviews are Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews (PDR' s and CDR
' 
s), 
First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI), Customer Acceptance 
Readiness Reviews (CARR) and Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR). 
Through the ~ID Apollo CSM Program Manager I s Of'f'ice, control 
is exercised over CSM program costs, schedule and quality. The 
control media include the following: 
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1. 	 cost Control is provided primarily through Joint NASA/NAA 
negotiated and approved "work packages" with individual work 
package managers assigned to control costs, schedule achieve­
ments and quality. The choice of work package breakdown 
structure has enabled individual cost control of functional 
elements within s&.ID as well as major subcorttractors which 
supply CSM SUbsystems. NASA, NAA division and carporate poliCies 
assure proper make or buy deCisions, subcontractor bid selection, 
and the like. 
2. 	 Schedule Control is provided by use of a "Master Development 
Schedule," a formal schedule change system, a PERT reporting 
system of scheduled milestones and formal critical problem 
reports. Major schedule changes receive concurrence of the 
NASA Program. Manager prior to NAA implementation. The selec­
tion of schedule milestones, monitored by PERT are also identified 
in the cost control work packages, yielding an integrated 
cost/schedule measuring device. 
3. 	 Control of Quality is provided by (a) jointly approved hardware 
qualification test-selection, criteria, test surveillance and test 
report approval, (b) Joint NASA/NAA mandatory inspection point 
assignments and surveillance, and (c) step-by-step inspections 
(NASA/NAA) through manufacture, checkout and prelaunch operations. 
A failure reporting system assures follow-up on potentially 
discrepant hardware. Control of subcontractor quality is 
provided in a similar fashion, with NAA and NASA approvals 
obtained as described in paragraph E. 
C. 	 Management Control Documents 
Management control documents for Apollo CSM hardWare exist 
at both the program level and at the first-line level of NAA s&.ID 
management. The top documents serve to record design and product 
certification and flight readiness. These are the jointly approved 
minutes of PDR, CDR, FACI, CARR, Design Certification Review (ncR) 
and FRR. 
The 	 first-line level management control documents are: 
1. 	 Design - Master Change Records (MCR), drawings, process 
specifications, interface control documents and measurement 
lists. 
2. 	 Manufacturing - Fabrication and inspection record tickets, 
tool orders and parts replacement requests. 
3. 	 Material (Purchasins) - Purchase order, purchase order change 
notice and specification control documents. 
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4. 	 Test and Operations - Operational test plan, operational 
checkout procedure, not satisfactory report, test prepara­
tion sheet, development test procedure. 
5. 	 Quality and Reliability Assurance - Inspection test instruc­
tions, material review disposition and quality control 
specifications. 
D. 	 Configuration Management 
Configuration Management is practiced through compliance with the 
NASA Apollo Configuration Management Manual and NAA Division Policies 
as implemented by the Apollo CSM Change Control Board, chaired by 
the Assistant Program Manager. Configuration changes with major 
program impact are resolved at Joint Change Control Board meetings 
between the NASA and s&ID Program Managers. 
Changes imposed on program baselines originate from both NASA 
and NAA. NASA directed changes are processed by Contracts through 
the Change Control Board for preparation of proposals. Inhouse 
changes are processed by the Apollo CSM chief project engineer also 
through the Board for evaluation and direction. Change control 
documentation is in the form of a Master Change Record (MCR) which 
defines the change and is the basis of an order to the functional 
departments to provide cost and schedule information for necessary 
evaluation, prior to final implementation. The MCR can be used, as 
above, to determine details of a change prior to implementation; 
however, for urgent changes the purpose of the MCR is to initiate 
action, which is accomplished upon MCR approval by Program Management 
for "Release to Production." 
Configuration records are maintained in mechanized records of 
released engineering drawings and specifications. These records 
provide indentured drawing lists, parts lists and alpha-numeric 
parts or drawing lists. The manufacturing planning system assures 
drawings and engineering order (E.O.) compliance utilizing Fabrica­
tion and Inspection Records (FAIR) and a Change Verification Record 
(evR) for each end item. The FAIR proVides both fabrication instruc­
tions and inspection verification; the CVR provides E.O. records and 
verification of compliance. ' 
During Downey Houston and Florida testing, a Test and Inspec­
tion Record (TAIR) system provides identical configuration and 
inspection information. 
E. 	 Subcontractor control baselines consist of (a) approved design 
specifications, drawings, components, qualification test plans and 
reports, acceptance test plans, critical process specifications, 
and component failure histories. A FACI is conducted for complex 
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(major) procurements by s&ID with an NASA audit. Other procure­
ments are subjected to FACI at NAA, utilizing subcontractor data. 
All baselines are reverified to NASA at the SC 101 (Block II 
lunar capable vehicle) FACI. 
Conformance of the subcontractors is controlled by "freezingtl 
component changes at FACI, strict part number control, identifica­
tion and reidentification, source or receiving inspection to 
formally approved drawings and baselines and component repair 
or overhaul, controlled to the configuration specified in the 
approved baseline. 
Changes are justifiable only for NASA or NAA requirements 
modifications; failure in qualification, during production or in 
operational tests; or for significant cost reduction. Change 
controls parallel the NASA-s&ID change control procedures. This 
method of subcontractor control is in effect at such major sub­
contractors as Honeywell, AiResearch, Beec~ and Pratt and Whitney. 
F. Field Site Control 
Apollo CSM Program Field Site efforts with activities at 
Florida, MSC-Houston, White Sands, New Mexico, and El Centro, 
California, are managed as are similar efforts in Downey. The 
management differences are caused by the fact that hardware at 
field sites has usually been transferred to NASA owned, and also 
is governed by NASA field site management procedures, rather than 
NAA or NASA-MSC. 
Hardware flow through the field site is controlled by the 
Ground Operat ions Requirement Plan (GORP) contractual document, 
as modified by operational changes and deviations approved by 
the NASA-KSC or other field site change board. 
Hardware changes evolving fram NASA and NAA sources, identified 
previously, are processed through the Downey system for incorpora­
tion in a similar manner to other changes. 
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April 19, 1967 
TO: NASA Headquarters, Code C 
Attention: Richard L. Callaghan 
FROM: Counsel, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: Correspondence regarding Safety Office review of tests 
Pages 198, 200-202, Volume I-A of the stenographic transcript of the 
hearings before the NASA Oversight Subcommittee concern themselves 
with Congressman Ryan's questions with regard to Kennedy Space Center 
Safety Office correspondence relating to review of tests, and the 
Chairman's request that the correspondence be furnished for the record. 
The enclosure is all the available correspondence sent up by Kennedy 
Space Center to me for transmission to the Oversight Subcommittee. 
On page 255 of the transcript, lines 22 and 23, Congressman Winn was 
told that the time lag in recording engineering orders would be 
furnished. The answer is provided in the text of the letter to the 
Chairman. 
George T. Malley 
Enclosure 
GTMalley:scw 4-19-67 
G~3 
April 19, 1967 
Honorable Olin E. Teague 
Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics 
Subcommittee on NASA Oversight 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
During the course of the hearings, Congressman Ryan stated that it 
would be helpful for the record to show correspondence from the 
Safety Office, Kennedy Space Center, pertaining to timely submittals 
of operational check out procedures for review. The Chairman then 
requested that such information be furnished for the record. In 
compliance with that request the correspondence is transmitted herewith. 
Later on Congressman Winn wanted to know the time lag in recording 
engineering orders, originating at North American, Downey, in the 
Configuration Verification Record Book maintained at Kennedy Space 
Center. The best recorded time for a North American spacecraft 
engineering order to be received and recorded in the Configuration 
Verification Record Book is two days after release in Downey. The 
average time is between five and seven days. 
Sincerely yours, 
Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
Enclosure 
GTMalley:scw 4-19-67 
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Chief, Test and Operations Management Office, KE 
Chief, Safety Office, RE 	 RE-1/471/Barnett:mr 
867-3973 
Operations Checkout Procedures for KSC Safety Review 
1. Review of NAA sic 017 OCP status dated September 16, 1966, indicates 
that the allowable time between OCP publication and test date is only 
6 days. 
2. KSC Safety has repeatedly requested 30 days for review of 
procedures, but to date, a workable solution has not been established 
to assure our receiving the procedures by the required date. 
3. The present schedule for sic 017 OCP publication is not acceptable 
to KSC Safety. RE-l must have a minimum of 14 working days to give 
the procedures proper review. 
4. RE requests that your office initiate action to eliminate the 
aforementioned problem. 
Original signed by 
John R. Atkins 
0-35 
lnalc~~es ~hat the allowable time between OCP-publicati~n-~~d7test 
dat: lS only 6 days. KSC Safety has repeatedly asked for 30 days for 
reVlew of procedures, but a workable solution has not been established 
to get those procedures to us by the required date. 
Mr. J. Simmons, SCO-63 	 May 2, 1966 
Chief, Operations Safety Branch, QAS-23 	 QAS-23/131/Barnett:mr 

867-4317 

OCP-PO-K-4620, G02 Servicing System Test, and OCP-PO-K-4621, GH2 Servicing System Test 
1. SubJect procedures were received on the morning of May 2, 1966, 
with the cover letter stating that the tests were scheduled for 
May 2 and 4, 1966. 
2. It is not normal for this office to approve a flimsy copy of the 
checkout procedures. We can make comments on flimsy copies, but it 
appears that most procedures are changed before they are published 
,in the hardback copy. 
3. The two subject procedures do not have a NASA Systems Engineer's 
signature, so we must assume that the NASA Systems Engineers do not 
approve the procedures. 
4. By receiving these procedures with only one day to review them, 
this office cannot review them properly. 
5. These two procedures will not be reviewed nor approved until a 
NASA Systems Engineer's signature has been affixed. 
6. Further flimsy copies of any procedure will not be approved by 
this office. We will submit comments only to flimsy copies. 
7. These two tests do not have KSC Safety approval at this time, 
and KSC Safety will not condone the running of these tests with 
G02 and GH2 in the MSO until we have received and reviewed the proper procedure. 
Original signed by 
John T. McGough 
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Requirements &Analysis Branch, KG-l 
Chief, Operations Safety Branch, RE-l 	 RE-1/460/Barnett:mr 
867-3973 
Apollo sic 017 OCP Request for KSC Safety Review 
1. Please submit the attached List (Encl. #1) of Operations Checkout 
Procedures to KSC Safety for review and approval. Encl. #2 contains 
a list of OCPs which RE-l requires for update. 
2. Review of NAA sic 017 OCP Status dated September 16, 1966, 
indicates that the allowable time between OCP publication and test 
date is only 6 days. KSC Safety has repeatedly asked for 30 days for 
review of procedures, but a workable solution has not been established 
to get those procedures to us by the required date. 
3. The present schedule for sic 017 OCP publication is not acceptable 
to KSC Safety. must have a minimum of 14 working days to give 
the procedures proper review. Request your office initiate action to 
get those procedures to RE-l with sufficient time allowed for proper 
Safety review. 
Original signed by 
John T. M'cGough 
Enclosures 
as stated in para. 1 
cc: 
R. Walker, BEN-3 
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KG-l (559) 
North American Aviation, Inc. 
Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 
Attention: Mr. J. L. Pearce 
Gentlemen: 
Subject: Apollo sic 017 OCP Safety Review 
The following listed Apollo sic 017 OCP's are requested for KSC and 
Range Safety approval: 
OCP # TITLE 
0005 Integrated Test with Launch Vehicle Simulator 
0007 Countdown 
0033 Countdown Demonstration 
0038 sic Hypergolic Loading 
3112 LESIBPC to CIM Mate/Demate &Thrust Vector Alignment 
Verification 
3116 sic Transportation to VAS and Mate 
4070 CIM RCS Functional and Leak Test 
4074 SPS Functional and Leak Test 
4617 sic Ordnance Installation and Removal 
4736 Fuel Cell Cryogenic Servicing, LC-39 
4747 Propulsion GSE Leak Check 
K-5114 Water Glycol Servicing System Test, VAS 
K-4720 Helium Servicing System Test, ACE Control, MSS 
K-4721 Helium Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4723 SPS Fuel Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS. 
K-4725 CIM RCS Fuel Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4727 SPS Oxidizer Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4729 SIM RCS Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4731 CSM RCS Oxidizer Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4732 LH2 Servicing System Test, ACE Control, MSS 
K-4733 LH2 Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4734 102 Servicing System Test, ACE Control, MSS 
K-4735 L02 Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
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OCP # TITLE 

K-9187 L02 Mobile Storage Unit (S14-065) K-9188 LH2 Mobile Storage Unit (S14-066) 
K-9885 Loading and Unloading SPS Propellant Unit (S14-059) 
for Propulsion st Complex and Launch Complexes 
K-9886 Loading and Unloading SPS Propellant Unit (S14-058) 
for Propulsion Test Complex and Launch Complexes 
K-9941 Calibration of Propellant Mass Measuring System Using 
Oxidizer 
K-9942 Calibration of Propellant Mass Measuring System Using 
Fuel 
K-10027 GSE Evacuation and Reinstallation - LC-39, Pad A 
The following listed Apollo sic 017 OCP's are required for KSC Safety 
information and update: 
OCP TITLE 
3045 LES Build-up 
3071 C/M - S/M Mate 
3116 CSM/SLA Mating 
4058 Electro Explosive Devices Receiving, Inspection, storage 
and Pre-installation Checkout 
4072 slM RCS Functional and Leak Test 
4079 SLA Ordnance Installation and Removal 
4738 Pyro Verification Test 
The North American Aviation, Inc. sic 017 OCP status dated September 16, 
1966, shows six (6) days between OCP pUblication and test date. This 
schedule is not acceptable to KSC Safety. For proper review of tests 
conducted at KSC, KSC Safety will require a minimum of fifteen (15) 
working days. 
It is requested that NAA initiate action to assure KSC/SCO that the above 
listed procedures required for Safety approval be submitted with 
sufficient time for proper Safety review. 
Your cooperation is appreciated. 
Sincerely yours, 
Ernest N. Sizemore 
Chief, Planning & Technical 
Support Office 
cc: 
G. Schrooder, NAA Safety 
KSC copies only, noted: W. E. Williams, KE 
J. Janokaitis, KE-l 
A. Morse, DJ 
JVS:mbr 10/8/66 A. Busch, KB 
G. Sasseen, KC 
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Memorandum 

TO Requirements & Analysis Branch, KG-l DATE: Sept. 30, 1966 
FROM Chief, Operations Safety Branch, RE-l RE-1/460/Barnett:mr 
867-30/13 
SUBJECT: Apollo sic 017 OCP Request for KSC Safety Review 
1. Please submit the attached list (Encl. #1) of Operations Checkout 
Procedures to KSC Safety for review and approval. Encl. #2 contains 
a list of OCPs which RE-l requires for update. 
2. Review of NAA sic 017 OCP Status dated September 16, 1966, indicates 
that the allowable time between OCP publication and test date is only 
6 days. KSC Safety has repeatedly asked for 30 days for review of 
procedures, but a workable solution has not been established to get 
these procedures to us by the required date. 
3. The present schedule for sic 017 OCP publication is not acceptable 
to KSC Safety. RE-l must have a minimum of 14 working days to give 
the procedures proper review. Request your office initiate action to 
get these procedures to RE-l with sufficient time allowed for proper 
Safety review. 
John T. McGough 
Enclosures 

as stated in para. 1 

cc: 
R. Walker, BEN-8 
G-40 
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan 
OCPs FOR KSC SAFETY REVIEW AND APPROVAL 
OCP NUMBER OCP TITLE 
0005 Integrated Test with Launch Vehicle Simulator 
0007 Countdown 
0033 Countdown Demonstration 
0038 sic Hypergolic Loading 
3112 LES/BPC To cIM Mate/Demate and Thrust Vector Align­
ment Verification 
3116 sic Transportation to VAS and Mate 
4070 CIM RCS Functional and Leak Test 
4074 SPS Functional and Leak Test 
4617 sic Ordnance Installation and Removal 
4736 Fuel Cryogenic Servicing, LC-39 
4747 Propulsion GSE Leak Check 
K-5114 Water Glycol Servicing System Test, VAB 
K-4720 Helium Servicing System Test, ACE Control, MSS 
K-4721 Helium System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4723 SPS Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4725 cIM RCS Fuel Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4727 SPS Oxidizer Servicing System Te Manual Control, MSS 
K-4729 sIM RCS Fuel Servicing System , Manual Control, MSS 
K-4731 CSM RCS Oxidizer Servicing System , Manual Control, 
MSS 
K-4732 LH2 Servicing System Test, ACE Control, MSS 
K-4733 System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
K-4734 L02 Servicing System Test, ACE Control, MSS 
K-4735 L02 Servicing System Test, Manual Control, MSS 
0-41 
OCP # 	 OCP TITLE 

K-9l87 	 L0 Mobile storage Unit (S14-065)2 
K-9l88 LH2 Mobile Storage Unit (S14-066) 
K-9885 Loading and Unloading SPS Propellant Unit (S14-059) 
for Propulsion Test Complex and Launch Complexes 
K-9886 	 Loading and Unloading SPS Propellant Unit (S14-058) 
for Propulsion Test Complex and Launch Complexes 
K-994l 	 Calibration of Propellant Mass Measuring System Using 
Oxidizer 
K-9942 	 Calibration of Propellant Mass Measuring System Using 
Fuel 
K-10027 	 GSE Evacuation and Reinstallation LC-39, Pad A 
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OCPs RE-l REQUIRES FOR UPDATE 
OCP # OCP TITLE 
3045 LES Buildup 
3071 c/M-s/M Mate 
3116 CSM/SLA Mating 
4058 Electro Explosive Devices Receiving, Inspection, 
Storage and Pre-Installation Checkout 
4072 s/M RCS Functional and Leak Test 
4079 SLA Ordnance Installation and Removal 
4738 Pyro Verification Test 
Chief, Safety Division, QAS-2 
Manager, Apollo CSM Operations, SCO-8 
Transmittal of Apollo sic 011 Technical Information 
Ref: Your memo dated April 26, 1966, same subject 
1. Based upon the information contained in the referenced memo, NAA 
was requested to prepare a package showing documents anticipated sub­
mittal date. 
2. NAA's response is enclosed. It should be noted that in most cases 
the scheduled transmittal dates do not comply with the 30-day pre-test 
safety review requirement. It should be further noted that most of these 
cases concern documents previously approved for sic 009 and that the 
content is virtually identical. 
3. Due to the advanced schedule that has been initiated for sic 011, it 
is our feeling that the dates presented by the contractor in the 
enclosure represent the "best possible" and cannot be improved. 
4. If these dates are not satisfactory then the utilization of flimsy 
or advance copies for KSC and ETORS safety reviews must be reconsidered. 
5. If this is unacceptable, QAS should contact PPR and negotiate the 
resulting s/v schedule impact. 
6. This office will insure delivery of the documents to KSC Safety 
at the earliest possible date. 
George T. Sasseen 
Enclosure 
cc: 
G. F. , SCO-5 
J. Simmons, SCO-63 
H. E. McCoy, PPR-l 
A. E. Morse, PPR-12 
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May 9, 1966 	 66MF323 
John F. Kennedy Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899 
Attention Manager, Apollo CSM Operations (SCO-S) 
Contract NAS 9-150, 	 Safety Significant OCP1s, Status of 
Transmittal of 
In order that the current status of safety significant documentat on sub­
mittal for OSM 011 may be more fully understood, enclosures (I) through 
(5) are submitted for your attention. It should be noted that the only 
areas where NAA has not met the full 30 day safety review requirements 
are a limited number of OCp1s as can be identified from enclosure (3). 
The under-support of the 30 day safety review is primarily a re~lt of 
a faci lity ORO compression of 14 days and compression of the launch 
schedule. You are assured that NAA is making a determined effort to 
recover as much of the 30 day review time as possible and will continue 
this effort. 
It may be to the advantage of the KSC Safety Office to reconsider its 
position of not reviewing advanced copies of OCp1s in respect to those 
OCp1s showing under-support. An advanced review in combination with the 
complete file of specifications and drawings, currently in possession of 
KSC Safety Office, plus the knowledge that in most instances the OCP is 
a re run of LlC 009 p rocedu res, may reduce review time on the f ina 1 re­
leased OCP to a degree that schedule impacts can be avoided. 
The NAA Apollo Systems Safety personnel will be most happy to assist in 
any way possible to support your safety personnel in their reviews of 
procedures. 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. 
lsi J. L. Pearce 
J. L. Pearce, Director 
Apollo CSM Operations 
Florida Facility 
Space & Information Systems Division 
NOW:oed 
Enc. (1) Li sting of 0 rawi ngs (not included) 
(2) Listing of Specifications(not incl.) 
(3) Status of Safety Significant OCp1s for SIC 011 
(4) Explosive Materials Loaded in Components (Dot iDCl.). 
(5) Range Safety Requirements, Apollo Site Activation(not iDCl.)· 
cc: (PPR-l) NASA-KSC 
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Enc losure (3) 
STATUS OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANT 
OCP'S FOR SIC 01 
ITEM 	 OCP 
FO-K-0007 Countdown 
2.1 FO-K-0033 Countdown Demonstration 
0034 CSM Altitude Chamber Test 
c;') 3. 
I 
.po 
...... 	 4. FO-K-0035 Combined Systems Test 
FO-K-0038S/C ic Loading5. 
6. 	I FO·-K-1090 Water Glycol Servicing System 
Test, Altitude Chamber, MSOB 
7. 	I FO-K-1210 Water Glycol Servicing System 
Test, Cryogenic Test Facility 
8. I FO-~·2016 Forward rtment Bui 1dup 
9. I 	FO-~1:-3045 LES Bui 
10. 	I FO-«-'3069 ClM, SIM, CSM or SLA 

Transportation and Handling 

Date 
Transmi tted 
to NASA 
Safety 
5-4 
4-22 
4-14 
4-22 
4-14 
4-14 
Date Sched. 
for Transmit La 1 
to NASA 
Safety 
7-30 
7-12 
6-2 
7-21 
REMARKS 
7 days for safety review 
OCP is very similar to 
SIC 	 005 0033 except Cryo 
is used 
7 days for safety review 
16 days for safety review 
OCP is very simi lar to 
SIC 005 0035 except test 
is conducted in Alt. Chbr. 
7 days for safety review, 
OCP combines OCP's 4082, 
4622, 4624 & 4700 as 
approved for SIC 009. 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
ITEM OCP 

11. I FO·-tt:~3071 C/M ~ S/M Mate 
12. I FO-K-307IA C/M - S/M. Mate 
FO-K-3112 LES/BPC to C/M mateldemate and 
thrust vector alignment verification 
13. 
14. FO K-3113 C/M LES weight and balance and 
thrust vector alignment 
FO'K-3116 CSM/SLA Mating15. 
C') 
I 
FO-K-3117 SIC Transportation to pad and mate ~ 16. 
FO K-4058 Electro explosive devices receIvIng 
inspection, storage & pre-installation checkout 
17. 
FO-K-4065 LBS motor receIvIng, inspection 
storage and handligg 
18. 
FO-K-4066 Pitch Control Motor, Receiving 
inspection, storate and handling 
19. 
FO-K-4067 Jettison Motor Receiving, 
inspection, storage and handling 
20. 
21. FO-K-4070 C/M RCS functional and Leak Test 
22. I FO-K-4072 S/M RCS quad leak and functiol'lal testl 
23. I FO-K-4074 SPS functional and leak test 
24. I FO-K-4079 SLA ordnance installation and removall 
Date 
Transmi tted 
to NASA 
Safety 
4~14 
5-6 
4-14 
Ma rch 
4-14 
4-22 
4-14 
4-14 
4-14 
4-14 
Ap ri 
4-22 
Apri 1 
4-14 
Date Sched. 
for Transmittal 
to NASA 
Safety 
REMARKS 
30 days for safety review 
7 days for safety review. 
This is an "A" revision 
to the basic which has had 
the full 30 day review 
period. 
30 days plus for safety 
review 
30 days plus for safety 
review 
30 days plus for safety 
review 
30 days plus for safety 
rev iew 
Operation completed 
Ope ra t i on camp Ie ted 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
OCP approved by KSC safety 
OCP appro~ed by KSC safety 
OCP approved by KSC safety 
30 days plus for safety 
review 
ITEM 
25. 
26. 
en 
I 
~ 
\0 
27. 
28. 
29. 
)0. 
31. 
OCP 
FO-K-4082 Propulsion pad functional test 
FO-K-4086 SPS Fuel servicing system test, 
manual control, LC 34 
FO-K-4089 SPS oxidizer servIcIng system 
test, manual control, LC 34 
FO-K-4231-S/A SHMRCS Fuel servicing test, manua 
contro 1, LC 34 
FO-K-4237 SIM RCS oxidizer servIcIng 
system test, manual control, LC 34 
FO-K-4243 Helium servIcIng system test, 
manual control, LC 34 
FO-K-4249 L0 2 servIcIng system test, 
manual control, LC 34. 
Date 
Transmitted 
to NASA 
Safety 
4-27 
5-3 
4-30 
Date Sched. 
for Transmi tta 1 
to NASA 
Safety 
7-21 
5-13 
5-18 
5-23 
REMARKS 
7 days for safety review 
very simi lar to OCP 4074 
as approved by KSC Safety 
also was used on SIC 009; 
all specs and drawings 
have been approved 
16 days for safety review 
similar to procedure 
used on SIC 009, all 
specs. and drawings have 
been approved. 
14 days for safety review 
similar to procedures 
used on SIC 009, all specs 
and drawings have been 
approved. 
7 days for safety review, 
similar to procedure used 
on SIC 009, all specs and 
drawings have been approved 
7 days for safety review, 
similar to OCP used on 
SIC 009, all specs and 
drawings have been approved 
10 days for safety review 
similar to OCP used on 
SIC 009, all specs. & 
drawings have been approved. 
8 days for safety review, 
all specs. and drawings 
have been approved 
ITEM 	 OCP 
FO-K-4252 LH2 servlClng system test, 
manual control, LC 34 
32 
FO'K-4254 fuel servlclng system test, 
propulsion test complex 
33 
FO-K-4601 oxidizer servicing system 
test, propulsion test complex 
34 
FO-K-4602 pressurization servicing systems 
test, propulsion test complex 
35 
FO-K-4615 fuel cell and cryo servicing, 
cryogenic test facility 
36 
FO-K-4616 cryogenic storage system~ 37 
verification, cryogenic test facilityVI 
o 
38~ 	 FO-K-4617 SC ordnance installation and 
remova 1 
39~ 	 FO-K-4618 LH2 servlclng system test, manual 
control, cryogenic test facility 
40J 	 FO-K-4619 L02 servicing system test, manual 
control, cryogenic test facility 
41.1 	 FO-K-4622 SPS tanking/detanking LC 34 
Sf;!"Ct ion 1 - AC E con t ro I 
section 2 - manual control 
42.1 	 FO-K-4624 C/M RCS tanking/detanking LC 34 
sectiop 1 - ACE control 
section 2 - manual control 
Date 
Transmitted 
to NASA 
Safety 
March 
March 
March 
5-3 
4-29 
4-14 
4-14 
Date Sched. 
for Transmi tta I 
to NASA 
Safety 
5-31 
7-8 
7-21 
7-21 
REMARKS 
8 days for safety review, 
all specs, & drawings have 
been approved. 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
OCP 	 approved by KSC Safety 
OCP 	 approved by KSC Safety 
7 days for safety review, 
similar to OCP used on 
SIC 	 009, specs and drawings 
have been approved. 
Operation completed 
Operation completed 
7 days for safety review 
same as approved for SIC 009 
all specs and drawings have 
been approved. 
7 days for safety review, 
same as approved for SIC 009 
all specs and drawings have 
been approved 
ITEM 	 OCP 

42. 	r FO-K-4624 C/M RCS tanking/detanking LC 34 
sectioo. I - ACE control 
sec tiQfl 2 - Ma nua I Cont ro I 
43. 	I FO-K-4700 SIM RCS tanking/detanking LC 34 
section I - ACE control 
section 2 - Manual control 
44. I 	 FO-K-4736 fuel cell cryogenic servicing, LC 34 
FO-K-4738 Pyr~ verification testC) 45. 
I 
VI 
..... 
46. I 	 FO-K-474I - Fuel cell servicing, LC-34 
47. 	 I FO-K-8227A SIM RCS quantity gaging system cali~ 
brat ion 
48. 	 I FO-K-8236 gas chromatograph analysis system 
and checkout PLA 
49. 	 FO-K-9179A LH2 transfer unit (SI4-026) 
50. 	 FO-K-9180A L02 trnasfer unit (SI4-032) 
51. 	 FO-K-9187A L02 mobile storage unit (SI4-065) 
Date 
Transmi tted 
to NASA 
Safety 
4-22 
4-11 
4-11 
4-11 
Date Sched. 
for Transmi tta I 
to NASA 
Safety 
7-21 
7-21 
7-12 
5-20 
6-9 
5-11 
REMARKS 

7 days for safety review, 
same as approved for SIC 
009, all specs. & drawings 
have been approved. 
7 days for safety review, 
same as approved for 
SIC 009, all specs. & 
drawings have been approved. 
7 days for safety review, 
OCP is almost identical to 
OCP 4615 which is approved 
by KSC Safety 
30 days plus for safety 
review 
7 days for safety review, 
OCP is almost identical to 
OCP 4615 which is approved 
by KSC Safety 
30 days plus for safety 
review 
7 days for safety review, 
complete package; specs., 
drawings and manual has 
been approved by KSC Safety 
OCP approved by KSC Safety 
OCP'flPproved by KSC Safety 
OCP approved by KSC Safety 
Date Date Sched. 
Transmi tted for Transmittal 
ITEM. OCP to NASA to NASA REMARKS 
Safety Safety 
CO)
•VI 
N 
52. FO-K-9188B lH2 mobile storage unit 
(S 14-066) 
4-11 OCP approved by KSC Safety 
53· FO-K-9882 ground equipment loading RCS 
propellant unit (SI4-057) hypergolic test 
facility and launch complexes 
Safety review not required 
for SIc 011 per agreement 
with KSC Safety; same as 
OCP approved for SIC 009 
54. FO-K-9883 Ground equipment loading RCS pro­
pellent unit (SI4-068) hypergolic test 
facility & launch complexes 
Safety review not required 
for SIC 011 per agreement 
with KSC Safety; same as 
OCP approved for SIC 009 
55. FO-K-9885 loading and unloading SPS 
propellant unit (SI4-059) for propulsion 
test complex and launch complexes 
4-14 30 days plus for safety 
review 
56. FO-K-9886 loading and unloading SPS 
propellant unit (SI4-058) for propulsion 
test complex and launch complexes 
4-14 30 days plus for safety 
review 
57. FO-K-I0004 SC instaUations and removals 5-3 a days for safety review 
very similar to OCP approv
for SIC 009. 
ed 
April 19, 1967 
TO: NASA Headquarters, Code C 
Attention: Richard L. Callaghan 
FROM: Counsel, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: History of Arcing in Spacecraft 012 
On lines 14,-16, page 105, Volume 1 of the stenographic trans­
cript of hearings before the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Congressman 
Fulton stated, 
111 would like to have the previous history of 
arcing put in the record and what the inferences 
and responses are from that history, if you please. 11 
Transmitted herewith is the requested History of Arcing, to­
gether with the inferences and responses. 
George T. Malley 
Enclosure 
GTMalley:scw 4-19-67 
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April 19, 1967 
Honorable Olin E. Teague 
Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics 
Subcommittee on NASA Oversight 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
During the course of hearings before your Subcommittee, Congress­
man Fulton requested that the previous history of arcing in 
Spacecraft 012 be put in the record and what inferences and 
responses were made from that history. 
The enclosed History of Arcing is therefore submitted for in­
clus;i,on in the record of the hearings. 
Sincerely yours, 
Flqyd L. Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204· Review Board 
Enclosure 
GTMalley:scw 4-19-67 
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HISTORY OF ELECTRICAL ARCING 

SPACECRAfT 012 COMMAND MODULE 

Five instances of electrical arcing in the command module of 
spacecraft 012 were observed and recorded on Discrepancy Re­
cords. 
Three arcing incidents occurred during installation and removal 
of the pyrotechnic batteries in the command module interior 
while the spacecraft was at ambient sea level conditions. The 
first occurred on September 14, 1966 during the installation of 
a pyrotechnic battery. Discrepancy Record 012-S !C-0176 states 
that an arc was drawn between the wrench used to install the 
positive battery lug and the battery mounting screw. The second 
occurred on September 23, 1966. Discrepancy Record 012-S!C-0248 
states that an arc was drawn, while removing a pyrotechnic battery, 
between the positive terminal of the battery and the disconnected 
negative battery strap for an adjacent battery. The third 
occurred on October 9, 1966. Discrepancy Record 012-S!C-04.08 
states that during installation torquing of a battery positive 
terminal, an arc was drawn between the wrench handle and the 
elapsed time meter case corner. 
In all three cases, an engineering evaluation of the arcing re­
vealed no damage to the spacecraft. The batteries involved in 
the three arcing incidents were ground support test batteries, 
and subsequently were returned to the battery laboratory for 
check out. . 
The installation of these batteries is extremely difficult due 
to the limited access to and the location of the units in the 
spacecraft. The batteries are ceiling mounted and the two 
screws used to mount the front portion of the battery must be 
installed or removed with a tool held at an angle to avoid 
touching the battery terminals. 
The inference drawn from the three arcing incidents during the 
installation and removal of pyrotechnic batteries in the command 
module was that the location or the design of the batteries is 
such that the probability of arcs from the batteries is high 
when conductive tools are being used to install and remove the 
batteries. 
The response was that Kennedy Space Center reported the battery 
arcing problem to Manned Spacecraft Center and requested a re­
design of the battery to preclude recurrence of arcing. The 
redesign of the battery is presently under study by the Manned 
Spacecraft Center. 
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A fourth arcing incident was discovered during removal of the 
pyrotechnic panel in the command module interior while the 
spacecraft was in an ambient sea level condition. This occurred 
on October 9, 1966. Discrepancy Record 012-S/c-0409 states that 
an arc was drawn between the top terminal of circuit breaker No. 
14 located in the top row of circuit breakers on the panel and 
the panel mounting nut plate bracket behind the panel. The con­
formal coating on the circuit breaker had rubbed off during the 
removal of the panel. 
The engineering evaluation of the damage to the circuit breaker 
and spacecraft was that the damage was not significant. The 
defect was corrected by replacing the conformal coating. In 
addition, personnel were cautioned to use extreme caution in 
installing the panel. 
The inference drawn from this arcing incident was that the 
routing of the wire bundle connecting with the pyrotechnic panel 
was not properly designed. 
The response was that soon thereafter an engineering order was 
issued which modified the circuitry of the circuit breaker so 
that the power side of the circuit breaker could not come in 
contact with the spacecraft structure during panel installation. 
The change eliminated the possibility of arcing. 
The fifth arcing inci~ent occurred while trouble-shooting a mal­
funct.1on discovered during Operations Checkout Procedure, OCP­
K-0005, when removing the C15-lA 52 spacecraft panel. This in­
cident occurred on January 17, 1967 at launch complex 34, at 
ambient sea level conditions. Discrepancy Record 012-S/C-0917 
states that while removing the panel an arc was observed between 
a screw driver used to remove the panel and a wire bundle 
behind the panel. Inspection of the bundle revealed that the 
insulation was damaged on the wire thus exposing the conductor. 
The damaged insulation was repaired by wrapping the damaged area 
with a heat shrinkable insulating material. 
The inference drawn was that a wire bundle was routed in front 
of the panel screws so that it was necessary, after separation 
of the wire bundle, to insert a screw driver through the wire 
bundle to reach the screws in order to remove the panel. 
The Apollo 204· Review Board recommended to the Apollo Program 
Office that the design of wire bundle routing be reevaluated. 
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April 27, 1967 
TO: NASA Headquarters, Code C 
Attention: Richard L. Callaghan 
FROM: Counsel, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: Information concerning organizational responsibility re 
Ground Emergency Provisions (App. D-13) Apollo 204 Review 
Board Report 
During the hearings before the NASA Oversight Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Congressman Rumsfeld 
stated (lines 15-17, p. 231, Vol. l-A Steno. Transcript): 
liThe Board should submit information as to who was 
responsible on pages 1311 to D-1313. By whom was it 
'not considered' for example?" 
The pages referred to are found in the report of Panel 13, Ground 
Emergency Provisions, at pages D-13-11, D-13-12 and D-13-13 setting 
forth the Findings and Determinations. 
The information furnished to the subcommittee is based on advice 
received from Manned Spacecraft Center and Kennedy Space Center. 
George T. Malley 
GTMalley:edm 4-27-67 
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April 27, 1967 
Honorable Olin E. Teague 
Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics 
Subcommittee on NASA Oversight 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D. C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
During the hearings held on April 10, 1967, Congressman Rumsfeld 
requested the Apollo 204 Review Board to submit information as 
to who was responsible for the various elements of ground emergency 
procedures that were stated in the Findings and Determinations on 
pages D-13-ll to D-13-13 of Appendix D to the Board's Report. 
Enclosure 1 furnishes the requested information. 
The organizational elements having primary and secondary responsi­
bilities are identified after each Finding. The term primary 
responsibility means documented functional responsibility for the 
efforts involved in either the generation, review or approval of 
the subject matter treated in the Finding. The term secondary 
responsibility means an operational or developmental participation 
which, as a normal function, would require an awareness or surveillance 
of the subject matter treated in the Finding. 
At Manned Spacecraft Center the organizational responsibilities 
have been defined to the directorate level within the Manned 
Spacecraft Center. The respon"dbilities fall into three groups: 
1. Generation of procedures 
2. Review or approval of procedures or design 
3. Design of spacecraft or ground systems 
Manned Spacecraft Center, as an organization, had the responsibility 
for one or more of the three groups only in Findings 1-5 and 7. 
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At Kennedy Space Center, the organizational responsibilities have 
been defined to an Office or Division level. The detailed delinea­
tion of areas of responsibility at KSC, it is understood, will be 
furnished by the Associate Administrator, OMSF. Therefore, to 
avoid unnecessary duplication, the Offices and DiVisions have only 
been identified as having either primary or secondary responsibility. 
At North American Aviation Florida Facility, the organizational 
responsibilities have been defined to the Department or Office level. 
Sincerely yours, 
Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
Enclosure 
GTMa11ey:edm 4-27-67 
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ENCLOSURE 1 

FINDING NO.1 

The applicable test documents and flight crew procedures for the AS-204 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test did not include safety considera­
tions, emergency procedures, or emergency equipment requirements relative 
to the possibility of an internal spacecraft fire during the operation. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
1. Apollo Spacecra:f't Program. Office 	 Review 
2. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 	 Review 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
1. The Safety Office of the Directorate of Installation Support (DIS) 
2. 	 The Flight Systems Division of the Directorate of Spacecraft 
Operations (SCO) 
Secondary Responsibility: 
1. 	 Test and Operations Office of the Directorate of Launch Operations 
(DLO) 
2. SCO Test and Management Office 
NORTH 	 AMERICAN AVI,(\TION FLORIDA FACILITY (NAAFF) 
Primary Responsibility: 
1. NAAFF Command and Service' Module (CSM) Safety Office 
2. NAAFF Spacecraft Engineering Department 
Secondary Responsibility: 
NAAFF 	 Spacecraft Operations Department 
FINDING NO.2 
There are no documented safety instructions or emergency procedures in 
existence which are applicable to the possibility of a seriolls internal 
spacecraft fire. 
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MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
1. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 
2. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
1. DIS Safety Office 
2. SCO Flight Systems Division 
Secondary Responsibility: 
1. DLO Test Operations Office 
2. SCO Test and Management Office 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACILITY 
Primary Responsibility: 
1. NAAFF Apollo CSM Safety Office 
2. NAAFF Engineering Office 
Secondary Responsibility: 
~ Operations Office 
FINDING NO.3 
Generation (flight crew 
procedures only) 
Review/approval 
The propagation rate of the fire involved in the AS-204 accident was 
extremely rapid (reference report by Panel 5). Removal of the three 
spacecraft hatches to effect emergency egress from either the inside or 
outside involved a minimum of 40 and 70 seconds, respectively, under 
ideal conditions. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
1. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
2. Engineering and Development Directorate 
Determined the accept­
ability of the spacecraft 
hatch design 
Determined the accept­
ability of the spacecraft 
hatch design 
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:3. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 	 Determined the accept­
ability of the spacecraft 
hatch design 
4. 	 Flight Operations Directorate Determined the accept­
ability of the spacecraft 
hatch design 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
None 
FINDING No.4 
Procedures for unaided egress from the spacecraft were documented and 
available. The AS-204 flight crew had participated in a total of eight 
egress exercises employing those procedures. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
1. Flight Crew Operations Directorate 	 Generation 
2. Flight Operations Directorate 	 Approval 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
The Emergency Egress Working Group (EEWG) of the Apollo Launch Operations 
Committee (ALOC). 
The EEWG is comprised of appropriate disciplines from NASA, AFETR, and 
NAAFF personnel. Chairman of both the EEWG and the ALOe is the Director 
of Launch Operations, KEC. 
FINDING NO.5 
The Apollo Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Procedures Manual contains pro­
cedures relative to unaided, aided, and incapacitated flight crew egress. 
By scope and definition, this document is concerned only with evacuation 
of the flight crew from the spacecraft and the pad under hazardous condi­
tions occurring primarily external to the spacecraft during a launch 
operation. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Flight Crew Operations Directorate 	 Generation 
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KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 

Primary Responsibility: 
Same as for Finding No.4. 
FINDING No.6 
The spacecraft pad work team on duty at the time of the accident had not 
been given emergency training drills for combating fires in or around the 
spacecraft or for emergency crew egress. They were trained and equipped 
only for a normal hatch removal operation. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
None 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
l. DIS Safety Office 
2. DLO Test Operations Office· 
3. SCO Test and Management Office 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACILITY 
Primary Responsibility: 
l. Apollo CSM Safety Office 
2. Spacecraft Operations Department 
3. Technician Support Department 
FINDING NO.7 
There was no equipment on board the spacecraft designed to detect or 
extinguish a cabin fire. 
:MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
l. 	 Engineering and Development Directorate Determined the accept­
ability of the design 
2. 	 Flight Crew Operations Directorate Determined the accept­
ability of the design 
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3. 	 Flight Operations Directorate Determined the accept­
ability of the design 
4. 	 Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Determined the accept­
ability of the design 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
None 
FINDING NO.8 
Frequent interruptions and failures had been experienced in the overall 
ccxmnunications system during the operations preceding the accident. At 
the time the accident occurred, the status of the system was still under 
assessment. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Apollo Program Office Review 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primarl Re~onsibilitl: 
1. DIS Safety Office 
2. DLO Test Operations Office 
3. seo Test and Management Office 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACILITY 
Primary Responsibilitl: 
1. Apollo CSM Safety Office 
2. Operations Office 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION DOWNEY 
Spacecraft Design Engineering 
AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE 
Range Safety Division 
FINDING NO.9 
Emergency equipment provided at the spacecraft work levels consisted of 
portable C02 fire extinguishers, Rocket Propellant Fuel Handler's Gas 
Masks, and 1-1/4 inch diameter fire hose s • 
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MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 

None 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
1. Safety Office of the Directorate of Installation support (DIS) 
2. Test and Operations Office of the Directorate of Launch Operations (DLO) 
3. 	 Test and Management Office of the Directorate of Spacecraft Operations 
(SCO) 
NORTH 	 Ar:.1ERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACILITY 
1. Apollo CSM Safety Office 
2. Operations Office 
AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE 
Range Safety Division 
FINDING NO. 10 
There are steps and doorways on the Launch Complex 34 Apollo Access Arm 
and in the environmental enclosure (White Room) which constitute safety 
hazards, particularly under emergency conditions. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Apollo Program Office 	 Review 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
1. Emergency Egress Working Group 
2. DIS Safety Office 
3. DLO Test Operations Office 
4. SCO Test and Management Office 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACII.J:TY 
1. Apollo CSM Safety Office 
2. Operations Office 
AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE 
Range Safety Division 
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FINDING NO. II 

During the preparation of sic test procedures at KSC, safety considera­
tions for hazardous operations and documentation of applicable emergency 
procedures are limited in most cases to routine safety reference notations 
and emergency power-down instructions. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
None 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Re~onsibility: 
1. DIS Safety Office 
2. seo Test and Management Office 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACILITY 
1. Spacecraft Engineering and Operations Departments 
2. Apollo CSM Safety Office 
FINDING NO. 12 
Under the existing method of test procedure processing at KSC, the cognizant 
Safety Offices review only those procedures which are noted in the OCP out­
line as involving hazards. Official approval by KSC and AFETR Safety is 
accomplished after the procedure is published and released. 
MANNED SPACECRAFr CENTER 
None 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
DIS Safety Office 
FINDING NO. 13 
Criteria for defining hazardous test operations are not complete. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
None 
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KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
~. DIS Safety Office 
2. Directorate of Spacecraft Operations 
NORl'H AMERICAN AVIATION FLORIDA FACILITY 
Spacecraft Management Office 
FINDING NO .14 
Requirements for the review and concurrence of KEC sic test procedures by MSC 
are not well defined. 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Apollo Program Office 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
Primary Responsibility: 
Apollo Program Office 
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LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER PRIORITY 
x 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
ATTENTION: DR. MAXIME A. FAGET 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
ATTENTION: COLONEL FRANK BORMAN 
NASA HEADQUARTERS 
ATTENTION: MR.. GEORGE C. WHITE, CODE MAR 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
IN MY CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD, I AM 
HEREBY APPOINTING A SUBCOMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE FIN~ REPORT OF 
PANEL 18 AND PREPARE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ITS ACCEPTABILITY 
FOR INCLUSION IN APPENDIX G OF THE BOARD'S REPORT. 
THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD ARE APPOINTED 
TO MEMBERSHIP ON THIS SUBCOMMITTEE: 
DR. MAXIME A FAGET, CHAIRMAN 

COLONEL FRANK BORMAN 

MR.. GEORGE C. WHITE 

MR." E. BARTON GEER 

IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS SUBCOMMITTEE MEET AND FORWARD TO ME 
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE ITS RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE 
PANEL 18 REPORT., IT IS FURTHER REQUESTED THAT THIS SUBCOMMITTEE 
REVIEW COMMENTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION CQRPORATION 
RELATIVE TO THE VALIDITY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE REPORT OF THE 
1 2 
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x 
BOARD AND ITS PANELS, AND IN SO DOING, DETERMINE THE VALIDITY 
OF ANY CLAIMS OF ERRONEOUS FINDINGS. 
IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS SUBCOMMITTEE MEET AT THE MANNED 
SPACECRAFT CENTER, HOUSTON, TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967, OR AS SOON 
THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT THIS 
ASSIGNMENT. 
SIGNED FLOYD L. THOMPSON 
CHAIRMAN, APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
2 2 
FLOYD L. THOMPSON, DIRECTOR 4761 MAY 12, 1967 - 3:30 P.M. 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058 
MAY 181M 
IN REPLY REFER TO: EA 
TO: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
FROM: Chairman, Special Subcommittee 
The subcommittee appointed by you to examine the panel 18 draft for 
Appendix G of the Apollo 204 Review Board Report met on May 16, 
1967. This .draft was edited as to technical content and is being 
forwarded to Mr. Jesse Ross for publication. 
The content of this report does not modify the validity of the narrative 
or findings of the 204 Review Board Report and its appendices. It 
does provide one significant piece of information concerning the cir­
cumstances of the accident. A complete analysis of data relative to 
the operation of the ECS throughout the "plug-out" tests indicates that 
there is substantial evidence of a small leakage of water/glycol during 
the test period. The location of this leak cannot be determined from 
data indications alone. Other considerations lead to the conjecture 
that this leak may have occurred within the Command Module. 
Since all planned analysis and investigations relative to the purpose 
of the Apollo 204 R~view Board are now complete, it is recommended 
that the SIC 012 be placed within its storage container and shipped to 
LRC. It is likewise recommended that all other material now being 
held by the board, such as SIC 014, be released to the Apollo Space­
craft Program Office. 

SUPPLEMENTARY 

REPORT OF PANEL 18 

INTEGRATION ANALYSIS PANEL 

APPENDIX G 

TO 

FINAL REPORT OF 

APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
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At the time of submission of the Panel 18 Final Repor~ a 
number of work activities were incomplete. These are sum­
marized below and are listed in more detail in Enclosure G-1. 
1. Open Circuit Breaker Analysis 
2. Open Fuses Analysis

3Q Electrical System Continuity Checks 

4. Command Pilot Boots Examination 
5. Cabin Air Fan 1 Wiring Examination 
6. Octopus Cable Examination 
7. Water/Glycol Data Analysis
8. Lithium Hydroxide Access Door Examination 
9. Completion of "Board Action Summary" 
10. Gas Chromatograph Data Interpretation 
11. Water/Glycol Tests 
12. Boilerplate Fire Test Analysis 
13. Crushed DC Instrumentation Harness Examination 
14. Analysis of Voice Tapes 
15. Torque Motor Voltage Transient Analysis 
The above activities have been completed. The completion did 
not disclose any new suspect areas which may have caused the 
accident. The results of these activities are summarized in 
this report. . 
In addition, two other activities which have been omitted 
from the above listing have been completed". These are: 
16. ECS Cable Assemblies Examination 
17. Completion of "Summary of Special Tests" 
All Panel 18 activities are concluded with the submission 
of this report. 
1. Open Circuit Breaker Analysis 
Enclosure 18-4 of Appendix D listed 33 circuit breakers that 
were to be closed but were found open after the accident. 
The causes of the open circuit breakers were not known at 
the time of issuance of the Board Report. It was thought 
that a determination as to when or why each circuit breaker 
opened may disclose additional suspicious wiring areas. 
The Analysis has been completed. No new suspicious wiring 
areas resulted from this analysis. A complete list of the 
open circuit breakers and the associated analysis is attached 
as Enclosure G-2. 
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2. 	 Open Fuses Analysis 
At the time of issuance of the Board Report, the ident ity of 
all 	blown fuses was not established. It was thought that 
an analysis of when and why each fuse opened may disclose 
additional suspicious wiring areas. 
The 	analysis has been completed. Fourteen fuses were found 
open. No new suspicious wiring areas resulted from this 
analysis. A complete list of the fourteen open fuses and 
the 	associated analysis is attached as Enclosure G-3. 
3~ 	 Electrical System Continuity Checks 
At the time of issuance of the Board Report, additional con­
tinuity checks were required to establish that certain sus­
pect wiring was installed as required by manufacturing draw­
ings. 
The checks have been completed. All suspect wiring was in­
stalled as required by manufacturing drawings. Specifically, 
the following wiring was checked, (all other suspect wiring 
was checked previously): 
(a) 	Arc between a DC Wire and the Cover of J-Box 

CI5-1A52: The wire was established to be tied 

into the DC bus A circuit. 

(b) 	Shorted Gas Chromatograph AC Wiring: The w~r~ng 
was established to be tied into the AC bus I phase 
A circuit. 
4. 	 Command Pilot Boots Examination 
An examination of the Command Pilot's boots was required in 
the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC to check the condition 
of the Velcro pad screws for signs of arcing. 
The examination has been completed. No arcing phenomena was 
observed on any of the screws. A summary of the examination 
follows: 
The boot soles were severely charred and covered with soot. 
The Velcro was burned off the bottoms of the soles. The 
upper portions of the boots were missing. Particles of 
material, exhibiting a molten appearance, were present on 
the left boot sole. Samples of this material were removed 
for a chemical analysis. Infrared analysis revealed that 
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the material was molten nylon. The screw heads were photo­
graphed, cleaned with ethyl alcohol and examined micro­
scopically. No signs of arcing were observed on any of the 
six screws. 
5. Cabin Air Fan I Wiring Examination 
An examination of cabin air fan I AC wiring was required in 
the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC to establish with complete 
certainty that shorting was an effect of the fire. 
The examination has been completed. A summary of the exami­
nation follows: 
An abraded region on one of four wires probably resulted 
from contact during removal of the cabin fan. Melted material 
found among the inner strands of another wire was solder, 
which flowed along the wire after heating of the connector 
during the fire. Thermal degradation of the wire strands 
was restricted to grain growth. No melting was found. It 
is concluded that shorting was a consequence of the fire, 
in which the insulation of the cabin fan wiring was de­
stroyed in two regions. 
6. Octopus Cable Examination 
An examination of the octopus cable was required in the 
Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC to establish with complete 
certainty that shorting was an effect of the fire. 
The examination has been completed. It is concluded that 
shorting was a consequence of the fire, in which the twisted 
unshielded wires were exposed in places due to insulation 
melting. 
7. Walter/Glycol Data Analysis 
The data from the water/glycol cooling system has been 
analyzed for the time period from 20:30:00 to 23:30:00 GMT. 
This analysis disclosed the possibility of a small leak in 
the system (spacecraft and ground loop) in the order of 50cc 
during this time period. 
Enclosure G-4 depicts the results of the analysis of the 
water/glycol volume change over the 3-hour period. The curves 
presented in this enclosure are the measured volume change, 
the calculated increments due to temperature and pressure 
effects, and the volume change which cannot be accounted 
for by the analysis, other than leakage. The derivation of 
water/glycol volume change data is somewhat complex and in­
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vo1ves a multiplicity of parameters of varying degrees of 
accuracy. Because of this and possibly some unknown system 
variable, it is difficult to establish a degree of high 
confidence in the water/glycol volume change data. 
The water/glycol loop includes the spacecraft and GSE as one 
closed loop system. From all of the data available it can­
not be concluded whether the indicated leakage was internal 
or extern~l to the spacecraft. 
8. Lithium Hydroxide Access Door Examination 
An examination of the bottom of the lithium hydroxide access 
door was required in the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC to 
check for signs of arcing and traces of copper. This exam­
ination was required as an earlier visual inspection reported 
indications of copper on the bottom of the access dooe (Re­
ference page D-18-37 of Appendix D). 
The examination has been completed. No evidence of arcing 
along the bottom of the door was revealed. There was no 
evidence of extraneous copper or nickel in the suspect area. 
9. Completion of "Board Action Summary" 
All Spacecraft 012 hardware inspection, disassembly, test 
and analysis requirements were approved by the Board. The 
status of the implementation of these requirements was re­
ported by means of a f\ Board Action Summary." Approximately 
7 of 182 items were incomplete at the time of the publication
of the final report. 
The physical work for all Board Action Items has been com­
pleted. The completion of this activity did not disclose 
any new suspect causes of ignition. 
The paper work for two Board Action Items is being completed 
at this time: 
Action 168 - Phase II ECS Test and Disassembly Plan 
(All work subsequent to Phase II comes 
under the purview of the Program Office). 
Action 180 - Open TPS Technique to get work done 

after Board left KSC. 

All TPS Summary paper for Action 168 will be signed off by 
May 19, 1967. All TPS paper for Action 180 will be signed 
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off when Spacecraft 012 leaves KSC. No Board or Panel 
activity is required to complete the paper sign-off. Follow­
ing completion of these actions, the associated records will 
be forwarded to the Apollo 204 Review Board files. 
A final "Board Action Summary" was published on May 11, 1967. 
(Reference G-l). 
10. Gas Chromatograph Data Interpretation 
In Appendix D, it was stated that the gas chromatograph 
measurement output varied seven times in the 22:00 to 23:00 
GMT time period. It then remained totally quiescent for 
approximately 35 minutes and at 23:30:50 GMT, approximately 
14 seconds prior to the crew report of fire, it again pro­
duced an output. . 
Referring to Enclosure 18-7 of Appendix D, the level shifts 
shown in traces A, B, C, D, and E were bias shifts caused 
by cross-talk from adjacent telemetry channels. Tests have 
been demonstrated that this is normal and can be expected 
whenever a telemetry channel is not terminated in a signal 
source impedence of 5,000 ohms or less. The movements shown 
on traces F and G are most probably caused by crew movement. 
Trace H is considered to have a special meaning with respect 
to the accident because the trace was quiet for so long a 
period and an output then occurred approximately 14 seconds 
prior to the report of the fire. 
Tests were conducted at MSC to determine what physical phe­
nomena can cause an output on the gas chromatograph measure­
ment. Enclosure G-6 shows the outputs of some of these tests 
as compared to the sIc 012 output (Trace A). 
Trace B is from a sIc 008 test and shows the output which re­
sulted from handling the gas chromatograph cable and connector. 
The output magnitude and polarities are similar to the sIc 
012 output. 
Trace C is from a sIc 008 test and shows the output resulting 
from striking a high current DC arc near the gas chromato­
graph cable. These tests revealed that short circuit cur­
rents required to duplicate the magnitude of the sIc 012 gas
chromatograph output 'are much higher than the launch complex 
power supply can provide, inferring that the sIc 012 output 
was not caused by a DC short or arc alone. 
Traces D and E are from laboratory tests with a PCM system 
and show the outputs resulting from locally heating the gas 
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chromatograph signal wire with a butane torch. The polari­
ties and magnitudes of these outputs are similar to the sIc 
012 output. 
Trace F is from a laboratory test with a telemetry system 
and shows the output resulting from moving a one square foot 
grounded aluminum plate between one to twelve inches from 
the gas chromatograph signal wire. The output is the result 
of capacitive coupling between the plate and the signal wire. 
Certain body movements in proximity to the signal wire will 
produce similar capacitive effects. Output magnitudes and 
polarities similar to the sIc 012 output can readily be dup­
licated in this manner. 
Laboratory tests were run on May 16 and 17 where water/glycol 
was dripped and sprayed on gas chromatograph wires. Both 
conditions produced outputs similar in magnitude and polar­
ity to the output seen in sIc 012. 
The conclusion which can be drawn from these special tests 
is that the sIc 012 output could have been caused by one of 
the following: 
(a) Crew movement near the gas chromatograph cable, 
or physical movement and disturbance of the gas chro­
matograph cable. 
(b) Application of external heat or flame to the gas
chromatograph cable. 
(c) Dripping or spraying water/glycol on the gas chro­
matograph cable. 
11. Water/Glycol Tests 
A. Water/glycol effects on connectors 
Two tests utilizing five cable/connector assemblies were 
conducted at KSC in the Materials Analysis Laboratory. The 
purpose of these tests was to determine the effect of water/
glycol on connectors. The first test consisted of briefly 
immersing mated connectors in water/glycol, cleaning by
normal procedure, and then applying normal spacecraft elec­
trical power through them while in a 100% oxygen atmosphere.
The second test consisted of applying electrical power
through the connectors while immersed in water/glycol at 
normal ambient atmosphere. 
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No evidence of electrical breakdown or degradation was noted 
in the cable/connector assemblies from either of the tests. 
Crystaline growth was barely detectable on the connector pins 
after 20 days immersion or vapor exposure 
B. Water/glycol flammability 
Four separate tests were conducted at KSC in the Materials 
Analysis Laboratory. The purpose of those tests was to deter­
mine the ignitability and flame propagation on water/glycol
treated Teflon wire bundles and an aluminum plate. All tests 
were conducted in a 14.7 psia oxygen atmosphere. Three tests 
utilized 18 inch, 9 strand Teflon insulated wire bundles with 
a piece of Velcro attached to one end of the bundles which 
served as an ignition point. A piece of paper was attached 
to the other end of the bundles to act as a "flag" for flame 
propagation. The fourth test utilized a 3" x 3" x 1/8" alumi­
num plate wetted with water/glycol. 
In the first test the wire bundle was immersed in water/glycol 
for ten minutes, then evacuated for 22 hours at approximately
4,000 microns pressure in a test chamber. The test chamber 
was then filled with oxygen and the Velcro patch ignited by 
a nichrome wire. The second test utilized a water/glycol so­
lution from which essentially all the water had been evaporated .. 
The wire bundle was soaked with this solution then placed in 
the test chamber without additional evacuation and the chamber 
filled with oxygen. The Velcro tipped-end of the bundle was 
ignited as in the first test. The third test was a repeat of 
the first test, except that the 22 hour evacuation was approx­
imately 25 microns pressure. The fourth test was conducted 
by placing 50 drops of water/glycol on an aluminum plate and 
igniting with a paper cylinder. 
On the three wire bundle tests, the Velcro patch burned to 
completion and slight charring of the Teflon insulation occurred 
in the immediate vicinity of the Velcro. No further flame 
propagation appeared after the Velcro completed burning, anq 
the paper "flag" did not ignite.. The fourth test resulted 
in ignition and burning of the water/glycol. The aluminum 
plate did not burn. 
12. Boilerplate Fire Test Analysis 
Command Module Mockup Test 6B was conducted at MSC on April 4, 
1967. This was planned as the closest simulation to the Space­
craft 012 accident. Material selection and the layout of the 
most probable zone of fire initiation were duplicated. Pro­
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vision was also made for simulation of the oxygen and water/
glycol lines rupture in the mockup test article. 
The atmosphere at initiation of the test was 94% oxygen and 
6% nitrogen at a total pressure of 16.6 psia. The fire was 
initiated in the debris netting traversing the floor on the 
left side of the Command Module at the point where the DC 
wiring for ECS instrumentation laid over the Waste Manage­
ment System stainless steel line. 
The 	 following observations were made: 
(a) 	The elapsed time from actual ignition' to simu­
lated rupture was 33.3 seconds. 
(b) 	The first vertical propagation of fire occurred 
between 16 and 17 seconds after ignition on 
Velcro strips in the lower left-hand corner of 
the Command Module by the water panel. 
(c) 	The first flame above the Command Pilot's couch 
became visible between 17 and 18 seconds after 
ignition. 
(d) 	Ignition of Uralane foam in the heat exchanger 
panel occurred between 20 and 21 seconds after 
ignition. 
The elapsed time between the first flame above the couch 
and simulated cabin rupture was 15.8 seconds. This is in 
close agreement with the Spacecraft 012 data where the 
elapsed time between the crew report of fire and cabin 
rupture was 14.7 seconds. The elapsed time between ignition 
and first flame above the couch was 17.5 seconds in the simu­
lation. Assuming that ignition occurred at the time of the 
electrical abnormality on Spacecraft 012, the elapsed time 
to the crew report of fire was 9.8 seconds. The difference 
in elapsed times is almost a factor of two. 
It is believed that the above variation in elapsed times is 
caused by different burning rates of debris netting. The 
percentage oxygen content was higher in Spacecraft 012 
than in the test article. Special tests at KSC disclosed 
that the horizontal burning rates differ with oxygen content 
as follows: 
90% oxygen at 14 psia = 1.1 inch/second rate 

100% oxygen at 14 psia = 2.1 inch/second rate 
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13. Crushed DC Instrumentation Harness Examination 
An examination of a crushed wire harness for ECU instrumen­
tation was required in the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC 
to positively establish that no wires were shorted or 
damaged. 
This cable consisted of two three-conductor and two two­
conductor shielded sub-cables with an overall shielded 
cover. The outer copper braid and the inner braids and 
insulation, as exposed when the ends were stripped, ap­
peared uninjured. Electrical continuity was established 
for each conductor. 
14. Analysis of Voice Tapes 
Analysis of voice tapes during the period of the -fire has 
been concluded at MSC. The areas of additional concen­
tration were noise and open face plate evaluation. 
The noises were movement, breath, and noises not associated 
with any identifiable action. Even with extensive testing, 
simulation, analysis, etc., the probability of ever identi­
fying the sources of the noises or the activity associated 
with them is considered very low. No further work will be 
undertaken. 
In Appendix D it was stated that there was evidence of an 
open face plate in the time period 23:30:14 to 23:31:00 GMT. 
Further analysis of the data indicates no prominent energy 
in the ECS frequency range. The suit compressor whine was 
distinctive during an early open face plate time but was 
lacking during this time interval. It has therefore been 
concluded that the Command Pilot's face plate was not open 
immediately prior to the crew report of fire. 
The details of this analysis are contained in Reference G-2. 
15. Torgue Motor Voltage Transient Analysis 
The Spacecraft 012 Guidance and Navigation System Inertial 
Measurement Unit (IMU) outer gimbal (OG) and middle gimbal 
(MG) torque motor voltage measurements indicated a transient 
when the electrical anomaly occurred. The inner gimbal (IG) 
measurement did not indicate this transient. The transient 
was coincident with the transient on the AC bus 2 voltages 
at 23:30:54.85 GMT. 
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Test were conducted using Spacecraft 008 and a Guidance 
and Navigation System at MSC to try to duplicate the OG 
and MG torque motor voltage transients. These tests dis­
closed that the inverter could not cause the transients. 
The DC bus voltages were then adjusted so that bus B was 
higher than bus A, as was the case in Spacecraft 012. When 
DC bus B was then either opened or shorted momentarily, a 
transient appeared on the OG and MG torque motor voltage 
measurements. 
The IMU gimbal servo loop schematics were examined to 
determine how the transient was coupled to the OG and MG 
torque motor voltages but not to the IG torque motor volt­
age. Enclosure G-7 is a schematic diagram of the gimbal 
servo amplifier. 
Point A, on the right side of Enclosure G-~ receives un­
regulated power from both DC busses A and B. This power
is supplied through diodes from each bus to prevent a short 
on one bus from drawing current from the other bus and to 
allow uninterrupted IMUoperations in the event that one bus 
is disabled. An unregulated DC to DC converter takes power
from the same source and supplies minus 27.5 volts DC to 
point B. This power supply is unregulated so that long term 
drifts in the DC bus voltages will not upset the bias con­
dition in the servo amplifiers. 
Point C is the first point in the signal path (going from 
left to right) where the DC supply voltages are not Zener 
diode regulated. A DC power transient will be introduced 
into the signal path at this point and will be amplified by 
subsequent stages. The same magnitude signal will be intro­
duced into all three servo loops (IG, MG, and OG). The IG 
servo loop voltage gain is about one-tenth as large as that 
of the OG loop and one-fifth as large as the MG loop. Be­
cause of the small IG servo loop voltage gain compared to 
the MG and OG voltage gain, the transient such as that 
which occurred during the Spacecraft 012 test would not be 
seen in the IG servo loop voltage. 
It is concluded that the torque motor voltage transients 
at 23:30:55 GMT were the expected result of a DC open or 
shorted condition. 
16. ECS Cable Assemblies Examination 
An examination of two ECS cable assemblies providing DC 
pDwer to an instrumentation temperature sensor power 
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supply was required in the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC 
to check for conditions of arcing or shorting. 
Electrical cable assembly PiN 836599-1-1: The insulation 
appeared to have been destroyed over much of the cable 
length. When the braid was cut away from a badly degraded
region, no evidence of severe thermal degradation of wires 
(arcing or melting) was observed. This cable assembly is 
therefore no longer considered a suspect source of ignition. 
Electrical cable assembly PiN 836602-1-1: Part of this 
cable assembly has been burned and was missing. The ends 
appear to have been melted by flame impingement. This 
cable assembly is still considered a suspect source of 
ignition. 
17. Completion of "Summary of Special Tests" 
At the time of issuance of the Board Report, only a brief 
summary of significant special test results was attached 
as Enclosure 18-56 of Appendix D. Since that time, all 
but one of the special tests have been completed. 
All special test results are summarized in a report "Summary
of Special Tests" dated May 12, 1967 (Reference G-3). 
The one special test incomplete at this time is a lithium 
hydroxide cartridge test being conducted at the request of 
Panel 11. This test is not related to the cause of the 
accident. Upon completion the results will be deposited
in the Apollo 204 Review Board files as part of the Panel 
11 activities. 
List of Enclosures: 
Enclosure Description 
G-1 Memorandum ItOpen work at the time of 
submission of Panel 18 Final Report,1t 
dated April 5, 1967 
G-2 Open Circuit Breaker Analysis 
G-3 Open Fuses Analysis 
G-4 Water/Glycol Quantity Data 
G-5 
G-6 Gas Chromatograph Trace Comparison 
G-7 Gimbal Servo L~p1ifier Schematic 
G-8 List of References 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
IN REPLY REFER TO PK 	 April 5, 1967 
TO: 	 Dr. Floyd Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
FROM: 	 Chairman, Panel 18 
SUBJECT: 	 Open work at the time of submission of Panel 18 
Final Report 
The following work activities were incomplete on March 31, 1967, 
at the time of submission of the Panel 18 Final Report. These 
activities are in process at the present time, and their comple­
tion is required to complete the analysis of the 204 accident: 
1. Determine the cause for each circuit breaker found in 
an open condition following the accident. This requires an 
examination of spacecraft wiring. This activity may disclose 
more suspicious wiring areas. 
2. Determine the status of all fuses in the spacecraft. 
Fuses were used in the DC power circuits for instrumentation trans­
ducers and instrumentation related equipments. Once the status is 
determined, then we must determine the cause for each fuse found 
in a blown condition. As stated above, this requires an examination 
of spacecraft wiring and may disclose more suspicious wiring areas. 
It may be necessary to check the rating of certain fuses, and to 
run special tests on certain fuses to determine their characteristics. 
3. Conduct additional continuity checks to establish that 
selected suspect wiring was installed as required by manufacturing 
drawings. 
4. Examine the Command Pilot's boots in the Metallurgical 
Laboratory at KSC. The area in question is the condition of the 
Velcro pad screws to determine if there are any signs of arcing. 
IIICLOSUU G-l 
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5. Finish examination of cabin air fan 1 AC w1r1ng in Metal­
lurgical Laboratory at KSC to establish with complete certainty 
that shorting was an effect of the fire. 
6. Finish examination of octopus cable in Metallurgical 
Laboratory at KSC to establish with complete certainty that shorting 
was an effect of the fire. 
7. Continue water-glycol data analysis. This is required to 
establish factually and to reach a unified engineering judgement 
on integrity of the water-glycol loop. 
8. Examine the bottom of the lithium hydroxide access door 
in the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC to determine if there are any 
traces of copper. 
9. Finish the IIBoard Action Sunnnary. If There are approximately 
ten TPS's for which the results have not been received. 
10. Tests are conducted in which a wire will be sparked 
with a gas chromatograph connector nearby to determine if any out­
put can be produced. Data analysis will be required after the tests 
are completed. Tests being conducted on Spacecraft 008. 
11. Flammability characteristics of water-glycol and the 
inhibitor agent, and effects of water-glycol on spacecraft con­
nectors are continuing at KSC and MSC. 
12. Boiler plate mock-up fire tests are continuing at MSC. 
13. Examination of crushed DC instrumentation harness in ECU 
must be completed in Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC to positively 
establish that no wires were shorted or damaged. 
Analysis of voice tapes during period of fire is continuing 
at MSC. 
Conduct of another test en Spacecraft 008 to establish with 
certainty the Guidance and Navigation output data differences between 
a DC short and a DC open condition on the supply to the inverter. 
(N\ ~Q\,iJ-~~ 
A. D. Mardel 
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Open Circuit Breaker Analysis 
The following determinations were made based on an analysis of 
telemetry data, wiring continuity checks, and visual observations: 
Panel 22 Right-hand Circuit Breaker Panel 
CBlS 	 Master Events Sequence Controller Arm B 
This breaker supplied power to arm the pyro and logic 
DC B busses. Telemetry data indicated that the breaker 
was closed well into the fire, at least until loss of 
signal (LOS). 
CB15 	 DC Sensor Signal Main A 
This breaker supplied signal voltage to the DC under­
voltage sensing unit. Whenever the breaker is opened, 
a caution and warning alarm is generated. This did not 
occur, therefore it is concluded that the breaker was 
closed well into the fire, at least until LOS. 
CBl17 	 Scientific Equipment Bay 1 Power 
This breaker supplied DC bus B power to the Medical 
Data Acquisition System (MDAS) recorder. The MDAS 
recorder provided satisfactory data until after pressure 
shell rupture, therefore the circuit breaker opened after 
this time. 
INCLOSURE (;-2 
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CBIIS Scientific Equipment'Bay 2 Power 
This breaker supplied DC bus B power to Scientific Equip­
ment Bay 2 equipment which was not installed. However, it 
was found that these wires were shorted in channel "H" 
of the Lower Equipment Bay (LEB). Analysis disclosed 
that the shorting was the result of external heating. 
CB77 Battery Charger, Battery B 
This breaker supplied power to the control circuitry for 
placing battery B onto the main bus. This circuitry was 
operative when the batteries were placed onto the main 
busses late in the fireo The breaker was therefore closed 
at the time of initiation of the fire. 
CBl16 Gas Chromatograph AC Power 
This breaker supplied AC bus 1 phase A power to the Gas 
Chromatograph which was not installed for the test. Wires 
to this unit were found shorted in the LEB. Analysis in­
dicates that they shorted as a result of external heating. 
CB45 Telecommunications Group 5 
This breaker supplied power to the Earth Landing System 
(ELS) telemetry indications among other loads. The ELS 
telemetry data indicated that the breaker was closed 
well into the fire, at least until LOS. 
CB94 ECS H20 Accumulator Main A 
This breaker supplied power to the H20 cyclic accumulator. 
ENCL08UR.E G..2 
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Visual inspection indicated that the breaker had a clean 
stem. The lack of sooting indicates that the breaker had 
opened after the fire subsided in the area of the panel. 
CB76 Cabin Air Fan 1 AC1 Phase A 
This breaker supplied phase A of AC bus 1 power to cabin 
fan 1. Wires were found shorted near the connector of 
the fan. Analysis has disclosed that the wires shorted 
as a result of external heating. 
CB74 Cabin Air Fan 1 AC1 Phase C 
This breaker supplied phase C of AC bus 1 power to cabin 
fan 1. Wires were found shorted near the connector of 
the fan. Analysis has disclosed that the wires shorted 
as a result of external heating. 
CB33 ECS Suit Compressor AC1 Phase A 
This breaker supplied phase A of AC bus 1 power to Suit 
Compressor 2. Telemetry data indicated that a compressor 
was running through LOS, therefore the circuit breaker 
was closed during the initial portion of the fire. Wires 
were found shorted near the connector of the compressor. 
Analysis has disclosed that the wires shorted as a result 
of external heating. 
CB32 ECS Suit Compressor AC1 Phase B 
This breaker supplied phase B of AC bus 1 power to Suit 
Compressor 2. Telemetry data indicated that a compressor 
IRCLOSURE G-2 
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was running through LOS, therefore the circuit breaker was 
closed during the initial portion of the fire. Wires were 
found shorted near the connector of the compressor. Analysi 
has disclosed that the wires shorted as a result of ex­
ternal heating. 
CB92 ECS Waste and Potable H20 Main A 
This breaker supplied power to the waste and potable 
water tank transducers in the aft compartment. Wiring 
to the breaker was found to be shorted in the aft com­
partment area. This wiring was located 
pressure shell rupture, where there was 
damage. 
in the area of 
extensive wiring 
CB9l ECS Waste and Potable H20 Main B 
This breaker supplied power to the waste and potable water 
tank transducers in the aft compartment. Wiring to the 
breaker was found to be shorted in the aft compartment area. 
This wiring was located in the area of pressure shell 
rupture, where there was extensive wiring damage. 
CB43 ECS Transducer Pressure Group 2, Main A 
This breaker supplied DC bus A power to four ECS transducers 
CFOOOlP, 
CF0005P, 
CF0035R, 
CF0036P, 
Cabin Pressure 
CO2 Partial Pressure 
02 Flow Rate 
02 Regulator Outlet Pressure 
DCLOSURE 0"2 
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The transducer for CF0005P received DC bus A power only. 
The other three transducers were powered by both DC 
busses. The telemetry data from CF0005P were satisfactory 
well into the fire, at least until LOS, therefore, the 
circuit breaker did not open until after this time. The 
wiring harness containing power and signal leads for 
CF0035R and CF0036P passed under the lithium hydroxide 
access door and portions of it were totally destroyed 
by the fire. This wire harness has been previously 
identified as the probable cause of ignition. 
CB34 ECS Transducer Pressure Group 2, Main B 
This breaker supplied DC bus B power to three ECS trans­
ducers: 
CFOOOIP, Cabin Pressure 
CF0035R, 02 Flow Rate 
CF0036P, 02 Regulator Outlet Pressure 
It also supplied power to the 02 high flow time delay 
relay. Because the master caution warning light came 
on at 2331:14.7 GMT, or well into the fire, it can be 
concluded that the circuit breaker did not open until 
after this time. The wiring harness .containing power and 
signal leads for CF0035R and CF0036P passed under the 
lithium hydroxide access door and portions of it were 
totally destroyed by the fire. This wire harness has 
been previously identified as the probable cause of 
ignition. 
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CBll ECS Transducer Temperature Main A 
This breaker supplied DC bus A power to an instrumentation 
sensor power supply in the ECU. The power supply then pro­
vided power to five signal amplifiers for temperature 
measurements. Because the power supply also received DC 
bus B power, no conclusion can be reached as to when the 
circuit breaker opened. Part of this harness in the ECU 
has been previously identified as being a suspect cause of 
ignition. 
CBlO 	 Transducer Temperature Main B 
This breaker supplied DC bus B power to an instrumentation 
sensor power supply in the ECU. The power supply then 
provided power to five signal amplifiers f9r temperature 
measurements. Because the power supply also received 
DC bus A power, no conclusion can be reached as to when 
the circuit breaker opened. Part of this harness in the 
ECU has been previously identified as being a suspect 
cause of ignition. 
Panel 21 Right-Hand Side Console Bus Switching Panel 
CBS 	 Sensor Unit AC Bus 2 
This breaker supplied power to the AC bus 2 sensor. Visual 
inspection indicated that the breaker had a clean stem. 
The lack of sooting indicates that the breaker had opened 
after the fire subsided in the area of the panel. 
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Panel 25 Left-Hand Circuit Breaker Panel 
CB33 SCS Band D Roll Main B 
This breaker supplied power for RCS engine firing. 
Telemetry data indicated that the voltage was present well 
into the fire, at least until LOS. 
CB39 SCS Pitch Main B 
This breaker supplied power for RCS engine firing. Tele­
metry data indicated that the voltage was present well into 
the fire, at least until LOS. 
CB31 SCS Yaw Main B 
This breaker supplied power for RCS engine firing. Tele­
metry data indicated that the voltage was present well 
into the fire, at least until LOS. 
CB26 Gimbal Motor Control I Pitch Battery A 
This breaker supplied power to a gimbal motor control 
switch in the Service Module. Bare wiring to this breaker 
was found in the lower right hand area near the circuit 
interrupters. Telemetry data of the battery bus voltage and 
current indicated no anomaly before or during the fire. 
CB24 Gimbal Motor Control I Yaw Battery A 
This breaker. supplied power to a gimbal motor control 
switch in the Service Module. Bare wiring to this breaker 
was found in the lower right hand area near the circuit inter­
rupters. Telemetry data of the battery bus voltage and 
current indicated no anomaly before or during the fire. 
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CB16 RCS Propellant Isolate Main A 
CB15 
CB52 
CB53 
Panel 
CB3 
This breaker supplied DC bus A power to RCS propellant 
isolation valves in the aft compartment. Wiring to this 
breaker was found to be shorted in the aft compartment 
area. This wiring was located in the area of pressure 
shell rupture, where there was extensive wiring damage. 
RCS Propellant Isolate Main B 
This breaker supplied DC bus B power to RCS propellant 
isolation valves in the aft compartment. Wiring to this 
breaker was found to be shorted in the aft compartment 
area. This wiring was located in the area of pressure 
shell rupture, where there was extensive wiring damage. 
EDS 1, Battery A 
This breaker established one of the Emergency Detection 
System (EDS) busses. Telemetry data indicated that the 
breaker was closed well into the fire, at least until LOS. 
EDS 3, Battery B 
This breaker established one of 
data indicated that the breaker 
fire, at least until LOS. 
203 
Inverter 2 Power, Main B 
This breaker supplied DC bus B 
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the EDS busses. Telemetry 
was closed well into the 
input voltage to inverter 2 
Telemetry data of the output voltage of this inverter in­
dicated that the breaker was closed well into the fire, at 
least until loss of data. Also, an examination of the 
circuit breaker stem disclosed that it was clean, indicating 
that the fire had subsided in the area of the panel before 
it opened. 
Panel 150 
CB14 Pyro A Seq. A 
This breaker supplied pyro bus A. Telemetry data indicated 
that the breaker was closed well into the fire, at least 
until LOS. 
CB17 	 Pyro B Seq. B 
This breaker supplied pyro bus B. Telemetry data 
indicated that the breaker was closed well into the 
fire, at least until LOS. 
CB20 	 Battery Charger, Battery C 
This breaker supplied battery charging power to Battery C. 
Telemetry data of battery current and voltage indicated 
no anomalies before or during the fire. Physical inspection 
of this wiring, which is contained in the right-hand side 
of the spacecraft, revealed heat damaged insulation in the 
Panel 150 area. The breaker also had a clean stem indicating 
that it opened late into the fire. 
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Panel 204 Instrumentation Power Control 
CB3 	 Essential Instrumentation 
This breaker supplied DC power to instrumentation for two 
Service Module RCS quads. Telemetry data of pressures and 
temperatures for these quads indicated that the breaker was 
closed well into the fire, at least until LOS. 
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Open Fuse Analysis 
The following determinations were made based on an analysis of 
telemetry data, wiring continuity checks, and visual observations: 
EPS Fuse Box 
Electrical checks on the box revealed 4 open fuses. One was 
Pyro Battery A, two were on AC bus I Telemetry, and one was on 
DC bus A Telemetry. Telemetry data from three of these fuses 
, 
indicated that they were intact until well into the fire. A 

short was found in the wiring attached to the fourth fuse in a 

high damage area on the right-hand side at the floor. 

Instrumentation Fuse Box C28A5 

This fuse box was located in the crew compartment. It contained 

30 fuses. A continuity check disclosed that 4 fuses were open: 

F3 Supplied power to measurement CF0006P, Surge Tank Pressure. 

Telemetry data indicated that the measurement was satisfac­
tory well into the fire, at least until Loss of Signal (LOS). 
Fl9 	 Supplied power to measurement CSOIOOX, CM/SM Physical 
Separation Monitor A. Telemetry data indicated that the 
measurement was satisfactory well into the fire, at least 
until WS. 
F20 	 Supplied power to measurement CSOIOIX, CM/SM Physical 
Separation Monitor B. Telemetry data indicated that the 
measurement was satisfactory well into the fire, at least 
until LOS. 
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F23 	 Supplied power to a number of Earth Landing System (ELS) 
measurements. Telemetry data indicated that the measurements 
were satisfactory until LOS. 
Instrumentation Fuse Box C28A8 
This fuse box was located in the crew compartment. It contained 
30 fuses. A continuity check disclosed that 3 fuses were open: 
F4 	 Supplied power for Mission Control Programmer (MCP) functions 
for an unmanned configuration. Resistance checks revealed 
shorted wiring in the aft compartment in the area of 
pressure shell rupture. 
F6 	 Supplied power to a measurement which was deleted (CFOI30P). 
This was part of the Environmental Control System (ECS) 
instrumentation wiring destroyed during the fire. 
F8 	 Supplied power to measurement CFOI84T, CO2 Absorber 
Outlet Temperature. Telemetry data indicated that the 
measurement was satisfactory until LOS. This was part of 
the ECS instrumentation wiring destroyed during the fire. 
Instrumentation Fuse Box C28A6 
This fuse box was located in the aft compartment. It contained 
30 fuses. A continuity check disclosed that 2 fuses were open. 
F4 	 Supplied power to measurement CROOOIP, RCS Helium Pressure 
Tank A. Telemetry data indicated that the measurement was 
satisfactory until LOS. 
FII Supplied power to measurement CR2203T, Temperature on 
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Oxidizer Valve, Plus Y Engine System B. Telemetry data 
indicated that the measurement was satisfactory until LOS. 
Instrumentation Fuse Box C28A9 
This fuse box was located in the aft compartment. It contained 
30 fuses. A continuity check disclosed that I fuse was open: 
F22 Supplied power to two heat shield measurements. Telemetry 
data indicated that the measurements were satisfactory until 
LOS. 
ENCLOSURE G-3 
G-I03 

G-IOS 
Enclosure G-4: Analysis of measured change of water/glycol volume 

TheTe 18 DO IDclo.UTe G-5 

G-I07 


0 
:. 
en 
.:!:::! 
0 
> 
2 
0 5 Seconds 10 15 
------~ 
A. SC 012 
B. Test, result of handling the gas chromatograph cable. 
C. Test, result of striking a dc arc near the gas chromatograph cable. 
{Short circuit current greater than 200 amperes} 
D. Test, result of applying localized flame on gas chromatograph signal wire. 
E. Test, result of applying localized flame on gas chromatograph signal wire. 
F. Test, result of moving a grounded aluminum plate between 
1 and 12 inches from the gas chromatograph signal wire. 
Enclosure G-6: Gas Chromatograph Trace Comparison 
G-109 

n 
..(ADA error) T i ~ + ~[ ,m.s"" 
»­
c;::J 
(fli 
'h 
®zoner C 
1 tl--e -© 'A 
h1 ! !J_t':"! 
motor 
(ADA error I T 
monitor) (Torque motor drive 
I & TM monitor) ~ I _ -----r- (Torque motor ret) (Test input) Y'h ~l ( .-___~----"- (Inner gimbal I I ~ R31 feedback)I 82.5 
R32(3200,~ ,,0 1i=:311Eh - 11 ~ 10 
(Gimbal error 
signal monitor) 
(Gimbal error I 
signal) , 
-© 
 + ,. (Outer gimbal 
feedback) 
L 
j ! j !' r 1: ;:':~:'~:::'~k)
_____+ _____ + ____ +-__-.l.,_ (Coarse align 
error) 
L-_______-L____~---+---'- ( 0 Vdc) 
• ( 0 Vdc) 
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D-18-l3 

D-18-l8 

D-18-l8 
D-18 .. l9 
D-18-20 
D-18-20 
D-18-2l 
D..18..83 
D-18-63 
D-18-33 
D-18-34 
All 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PK May 1, 1967 
Corrections to Appendix D-18 
Change 
One circuit breaker on this page does not have a numerical 

identification. CB 24 should appear after CB 26. 

Chromatograph is mispelled in the sixth line from the top. 

Delete the last word "a" in the first line of the third 

paragraph. 
Change Ifwas" in •••• respiratory rate was noted •••• in 
the third paragraph, to "were. 1I 
In the last two lines on the page, write Inertial Measurement 
Unit like written here, instead of all capital letters. 

In the second paragraph, change 5.5 psig to 5.5 psia. 

In the last paragraph, change 21:31:20 GMT to 23:31:20 GMT. 

In the last line of the second paragraph, Figure 18-18 

should be changed to Enclosure 18-20. 

Enclosure 18-22 needs a page number. 

Enclosure 18-5 needs a page number. 

In the last line, change 8-A to c-8. 

Add the underlined words to the first line of the third 

paragraph from the bottom: 

Spontaneous combustion has been considered 

as a source. An extensive series of tests 

involving •••••• 

None of my black and white photographic enclosures 

contain any page numbers~ 

G-117 
Change 
D-18-35 In the fourth line of the last paragraph, change "harness" 
to "harnesses." 
In the second paragraph, add the underlined word: 
••••• just to the left of inverter 3. 
D-18-4l In the third paragraph, the word occasionally is mispelled. 
D-18-4l In the fifth line of the second paragraph: 
should be Enclosure 18-34. 
Enclosure 18-35 
D-18-43 In the last sentence of the second paragraph, delete every 
word after "Enclosure 18-41 shows •••• 0." 
D-18-48 In the first line of the second paragraph, 
is mispelled. 
the word attributed 
In the fifth line from the top, the word inadvertent is 
mispelledo 
D-18-49 In the fourteenth line from the top, change "telemetry date 
is" to "telemetry data are.!! 
G-llS 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 	REVIEW BOARD 
IN REPLY REFER TO pR-67- /,}...:t 
TO 	 Dr. Floyd Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
Langley Research Center, NASA 
Langley Station 
Hampton, Virginia 23365 
FROM 	 W. M. Bland, Jr. 
Chairman, Panel 8 
SUBJECT: 	 Test Results for Appendix G to the Final Report of 
Apollo 204 Review Board (TPS MA-Ol6) 
Enclosed are the final test results covering the Cobra Cable Spark 
Test, TPS MA-Ol6. These test results are for Appendix G to the 
Final Report of Apollo 204 Review Board. 
~~-_~~JI 
William M. Bland, Jr. 
Enclosure 
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Panel #8, AS204 Investigation Board DATE: May 8, 1967 
Chief, Teleoommunications Branoh, KB-5 
Final Report - Final Cobra Cable Spark Test, TPS MA-016 
Introduotion· 
This report establishes the results of the Final Cobra Cable Spark Test, 
AS204 INVESTIGATION, TPS MA-016. The test, performed at the Kennedy 
Spaoe Center by the Flight Systems Division, was designed to investigate 
the possibility of igniting a mixture of methyl-ethyl ketone (MEK) and 
oxygen by disoonnecting a orewman's eleotrioal umbilical. NASA dooument 
SP-48 indioates that vapors of various fuels are ignitable at very low 
energy levels, on the order of 0.002 millijoules. The above is based 
on an eleotrostatio spark disoharge at 1 atm and 100% oxygen. For a 
break spark, however, the required energy is slightly higher due to the 
quenching effeot of the short gap. The setup was oonfigured as-near-as 
possible to that of the Spaoeoraft Command Pilot eleotrical umbilioal 
at the time of the AS204 inoident, 
Purpose 
The prime purpose of the test was to investigate if disoonneoting or 
mating a crewman's eleotrical umbilical oould ignite the cabin environment 
when oontaminated by an explosive fuel. Seoond, the test was to establish 
if the malfunotions found in the Spaoeoraft Command Pilot suit oould have 
caused an ignition of the cabin environment when the orewman I s eleotrical 
umbilical was being disoonneoted. 
Desoription 
The Final Cobra Cable Spark Test was oompleted with test ohamber environ­
ments of 0.5%, 2.5% and 12.5% (saturation point) of MEK with the remaining 
atmosphere 95% or greater oxygen. 
The umbilical oontained a tee adapter, oobra oable, noise limiter, pressure 
garment adapter, torso harness, headset, and a physiological signal simu­
lator. The umbilical was broken at the noise limiter-pressure garment 
adapter interfaoe, and the noise limiter-oobra oable interfaoe. It was 
operating with the maximum power and signals, under normal operation, at 
the time of the disoonneots and remates. Repeated disoonneoting and remating 
at the various oonoentrations of MEK yielded no sparks or ignitions. 
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Test Equipment and Instrumentation 
The flight equipment used came from Spacecraft 012 spares and the Space­
craft 014 vehicle. Orewequipment was supplied by NAA Crew Systems. 
The associated instrumentation and test equipment were supplied by 
Bioinstrumentation and the Environmental Test Lab at KSC. 
sic Flight Equipment 
Description Part Number 
Audio Center ME 473-0021-003 
Audio Control Panel #26 V16-771226 
Audio Warning System sic 014 Equipment 
Cobra Cable V16-601263-41 
Experiments Tee Adapter V16-601396 
Noise Limiter V16-601549 
Pressure Garment Adapter V16-601357-31 
Skull Cap, Headset XA-1991-000 
Spacecraft Battery 4095-3A (Test Only) 
Torso Harness SL. 103120E 
Instrumentation and Test Equipment 
Biomedical PIA Rack SCC-100137 
CEO, Light Beam Recorder 
Chamber Vacuum Pump 
Differential Voltmeter 
Flammability Test Chamber 
Hewlett Packard 1 kc Tone Generator 
Physiological Simulator SOB-1005007 
Pressure Gauge 
G-124 
Instrumentation and Test Equipment (cont'd) 
Description Part Number 
Test Chamber Adapter Cable SCC-105024 
Tektronix, Oscilloscope 
Tektronix, Time Mark Generator 
Various interconnecting Boxes and Cabins 
16 rom 100 frame/second Camera 
Test Preparation 
Three operational modes were investigated during the test. Mode #1 used 
all possible crewman cabling, external to suit, with the exception of a 
sleep adapter which was not in the umbilical at the time of the sic 012 
incident. The system, Figure I, was configured such that three power 
circuits could be examined. The system consisted of right mike power 
28.0 vdc at 4 ma, left mike power 28.0 vdc at 4 ma, and bioinstrumentation 
power 16.8 vdc at 60 mao Six signal circuits were also operated. They 
consisted of mike, earphone, audio warning, electrocardiogram #1 and #2, 
and impedance pneumograph. The above power and signals were operating 
at the time of each separation and their levels are reflected in Table I. 
The flammability test chamber was built and operated by the Material 
Analysis of Kennedy Space Center. The chamber design allowed two electri­
cal feed thrus by which electrical power and the associated signals could 
enter. In addition to the electrical ports a mechanical feed thru allowed 
the disconnecting and remating of the connectors while maintaining a 
suitable chamber environment. 
Prior to the initial separation of the connector, the cables were allowed 
to oxygen soak for a six hour period at 16.4 ± .2 PSIA. The first 
separation was in an environment of 95% oxygen. Color pictures, 16 rom, 
100 frame/second, were taken to record action, sparks, and ignition if 
it occurred. 
The second disconnect was made in 0.5% MEK. MEK was introduced into the 
chamber by evacuating the chamber to 0.5 PSIA or less. MEK was introduced 
at the low pressure by a syringe through a rubber port. After completed 
evaporation, the chamber was back filled with 100% oxygen. With the 
environment established the connectors were repeatedly broken. The above 
procedure was repeated for each subsequent run. 
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Operation Mode #2, Figure II, deleted the tee adapter and the associated 
biomedical power and signals. The communication network was identical to 
that of Mode #1. The purpose of Mode #2 was to check the possible arcing 
or ignition from the communication circuit to the open ended bioinstru­
mentation circuits. 
Operation Mode #3 was a failure mode. The failure mode simulated the 
failure found in the Spacecraft Command Pilot torso harness after the 
incident. (Ref. TPS CM-CA-075). Essentially, two shorts were found: 
mike signal, return and shield, and earphone signal, return and shield. 
The shorts were accomplished by physically shorting the pins inside the 
Microdot connector of the torso harness. The test was run with only 
communication circuits operating. 
Disposition of Data and Parts 
The associated data, including strip charts, waveform pictures, etc. were 
turned over to NASA Quality Surveillance to be filed with the buy-off copy 
of TPS MA-016. 
Test and flight equipment were returned to the lending groups. 
Results 
Several separations and remates of the noise limiter-pressure garment 
adapter interface, at concentration of methyl-ethyl ketone (MEK) of 0.5%, 
2.5% and 12.5% (saturation) yielded no visible arcing or ignition. The 
above was repeated in Mode #2 and Mode #3 operation and again no sparks 
were visible to the observers. 
Later review of the 16 mm 100 frame/second film yielded no further infor­
mation. 
Discussion 
The Final Cobra Cable Spark Test was proposed to investigate the possibility 
of the Spacecraft 012 fire beginning with the disconnecting or mating of a 
crewman's electrical umbilical. In view of the fact that the Spacecraft 
Command Pilot had disconnected his noise limiter-pressure garment adapter 
interface either before, at the onset, or during the fire, prompted the 
Cobra Cable Test. 
A preliminary test (Ref. Preliminary Cobra Cable Spark Test Report, dated 
March 1, 1967) was run to investigate the power circuits. Right and left 
mike power circuits, along with biomed power circuits, were investigated 
at their normal operating levels. When normal operation failed to yield 
ignition the biomedical circuit was shorted and again the connectors were 
separated without any ignition. 
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Based on a value of 0.002 millijoules and operating currents of 60 ma 
and 10 ma, an induction of 0.111 mH for the biomedical circuit and 40 mH 
for the communications circuit is necessary to store enough energy for 
ignition. In view of the fact that the biomedical circuit is approximately 
10 micro-micro farads and the communication network is less than 40 mH, 
it is expected that no ignition would occur. 
Without ignition during the preliminary test the final test was run to 
investigate the possibility of'the signal levels and associated power 
circuits igniting a flammable mixture. 
The data obtained from the preliminary and final tests produced no 
indication that mating or separating a crewman's electrical umbilical, 
with the normal operating level, presented any threat to crewman safety. 
However, this is in no way a recommendation that the practice of mating 
and disconnecting connectors, with power on, should be approved or allowed. 
Conclusion 
Based on the data obtained from the Preliminary and Final Cobra Cable 
Spark Tests it is concluded that the disconnecting and/or mating of a 
crewman's electrical umbilical neither started nor contributed to the 
AS204 fire. 
W. R. Ste s 
, 
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APPENDIX 
Item # Description 
Figure #1 Mode #1 Operation 
Figure #2 Mode #2 Operation 
Figure #3 Mode #3 Operation 
Table #1 Pover and Signal Levels 
Photographs (7) Test Setup 
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* Failure Mode: Earphone Signal, Shield 
and return shorted together; and Mike 
Signal, Shield and return shorted 
together. 
TABIE I 
Description Voltage Durrent Power Level 
Right Mike Power 16.8 vdc 4 to 8 IDa. 
Left Mike Power 16.8 vdc 4 to 8 IDa. 
Biomedical Power 16.8 vdc 50 to 60 IDa. 
Mike Signal -10 dbm input to 
Audio Center 
Earphone Signal Odbm 
Audio Warning Signal 330 mv 
ECG #1 0-5 v 
EOO #2 0-5 v 
Respiration rate 0-5 v 
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SECTION 6 
REPORT TO DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NASA 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
May 26, 1967 
IN REPLY REFER TO 
TO: Deputy Administrator, NASA Headquarters 
FROM: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: Report of Completion of Apollo 204 Review 
Board Activities 
As of April 9., 1967, the date of the submission of the 
Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, 
seventeen tests were still being conducted and the panel 
charged with the analysis of the test results, Panel 18, 
was instructed by the Board to submit their report of the 
test results to the Board for approval. To review the 
'report of Panel 18, a Special Subcommittee was appointed 
by the Chairman on May 12, 1967. This Subcommittee reviewed 
and accepted, on behalf of the Board, the final Report of 
Panel 18 on May 16, 1967. Panel l8's report will be in­
corporated in Appendix G. In addition the Special Sub­
committee reviewed the comments of the North American 
Aviation Corporation relative to the Findings, Determina­
tions and Recommendations of the Board and its Panels. 
After review, the Subcommittee concluded that no changes 
were necessary for the Findings, Determinations and Recom­
mendations as originally submitted by the Board to the Ad­
ministrator. This action completes the Board's Report. 
During the course of the investigation, the Board received 
from various sources about forty items of technical material 
addressed to flammability and ignition in oxygen atmos­
pheres. It is planned, after coordinating with Manned Space­
craft Center, to designate an appropriate individual within 
Manned Spacecraft Center to be charged with the responsi­
bility of evaluating and assessing the technical and scien­
tific data contained in this material and to assure that 
it is made available to cognizant NASA elements. 
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The files containing the working materials, records, films 
and tapes are presently being catalogued and indexed. This 
should be completed by the end of June 1967. The deposi­
tory is located in Rooms 103 and 105, Building 1195, Langley
Research Center. With regard to the Command Module 012 
hardware, presently located in the Pyrotechnics Building,
Kennedy Space Center, the present plan is that it will be 
packed,for permanent storage only after advice is received 
that the investigation by the two cognizant congressional
committees has been completed and no useful purpose would 
be served in continuing the display_ When it is decided 
that the Command Module, its components, related drawings
and the three spacesuits can be stored, it is planned to 
remove the storage container from Kennedy Space Center to 
Langley Research Center. 
All the medica'! records will remain 'as previously decided 
at Manned Spacecraft Center in the custody of the Director 
of Medical Research and Operations. 
Letters acknowledging contributions made to the work of 
the Board were sent to all the Panel Chairmen, represen­
tatives of major elements having an interest in the Apollo 
Program, consultants, and others who worked with the Board. 
Copies of the letters are enclosed herewith. The Chairman 
did not take it upon himself to direct correspondence to 
the agency heads that provided experts and consultants to 
the Board in view of the fact that the arrangements for 
the services of those people had been made by the Deputy 
Administrator. 
I think it appropriate to state that the authoritative 
studies conducted by the OART in its program on Life Support
Technology gave me and the other Board Members a great deal 
of confidence in the Board's position relative to the single 
gas versus two-gas atmosphere as stated in the Board's 
Report and as affirmed in our testimony before the Com­
mittees of Congress. 
Another important development that I wish to emphasize is 
the flammability testing techniques conducted at Manned 
Spacecraft Center. All of the Board Members are convinced 
that tests conducted at Manned Spacecraft Center during
the Board's investigation greatly helped the Board in 
arriving at its recommendations with regard to materials, 
configuration and wiring protection in the Command MOdule. 
More importantly, the new testing techniques constitute 
an important and valid basis for determining flammability
of materials to be installed in the spacecraft. 
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I suspect that correspondence addressed to the Apollo 204 
Review Board will continue for some time, and I recommend 
that such correspondence be classified into two groups: 
1. 	 that which can be.answered without follow-on 
action; and 
2. 	 that which is of interest to the Apollo Program 
Office and requires follow-on action. 
The first category could be answered by myself as Chairman 
of the Board; the other by the Apollo Program Office and 
the Office of gublic Affairs. 
The Apollo 204 Review Board respectfully submits that it 
has fulfilled all of its duties and responsibilities as 
prescribed by the Deputy Administrator's memorandum of 
February 3, 1967. Accordingly, it is requested that the 
Apollo 204 Review Board be dissolved. 
Floyd L. Thompson 
Enclosures 25 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
AP.OLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
May 25, 1967 
IN REPLY REFER TO 
TO: Deputy Administrator, NASA Headquarters 
FROM: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: Reply to North American Aviation Comments on 
Findings of Apollo 204 Review Board 
I have studied the memorandum submitted by North American 
Aviation, Inc. to the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, Com­
mittee on Science and Astronautics, ijouse of Representatives 
commenting on the Findings, Determinations and Recommenda­
tions of the Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board and its 
Panels. In addition I requested the Special Subcommittee 
consisting of Dr. Maxime A. Faget, Chairman, Colonel Frank 
Borman, Mr. George C. White, Jr., and Mr. E. Barton Geer 
appointed to review the final report of tests from Panel 
18, to also review the comments of North American Aviation 
relative to the validity of the findings of the Report of 
the Board and its Panels, and in so doing, determine the 
validity of any claims of erroneous findings. This they 
did on May 16, 1967, and my comments that follow are based 
on the Special Subcommittee's report to me. 
This review of the North American memorandum shows they 
concurred in the first nine findings and the eleventh 
finding. North American did not concur with Finding No. 
lOb which stated that coolant leakage at solder joints
had been a chronic problem. "Chronic" as used in the 
text of the finding simply means marked by long continua­
tion or frequent recurrence. North American conceded that 
there had been some leakage. What the Board intended to 
emphasize was the degree of the leakage problem. Panel 8 
made the finding, based on uncontroverted evidence, that 
there were 35 instances of water/glycol leakage on Block I 
Spacecraft involving approximately 320 ounces. The de­
tails are set out on Pages 18, 19 and 20 of Appendix D-8. 
It is readily apparent that the Panel 8 findings sub­
stantiate the judgment of the Board. In addition the 
final report of Panel 18, which was accepted on May 16, 
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1967, stated that there was strong evidence of an additional 
water/glycol leakage amounting to 50 cc. occurring about 
two hours prior to the accident. In my opinion, the Find­
ing and Determination of the Board with regard to the cool­
ant leakage at solder joints is valid. 
North American Aviation also took issue with the Board Find­
ing 10d, deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, 
rework and quality control in electrical'wiring. The com­
ments of North American were directed specifically to the 
design deficiencies in the wiring set out by Panel 9 in 
Appendix D 9-6. The Special Subcommittee replied to the 
North American Aviation comments directed to the deficiencies 
in the electrical wiring as follows: 
"In the cases where NAA expressed non-concurrence 
with the Board and or Panel they often presented
incomplete information to support their position.
For example, in the case of color coding of wiring
(page 11 of the NAA statement) wiring was in fact 
not color coded in some instances and the numerical 
coding which NAA claims to use in place of color 
coding was often missing. (The type of coding
and completeness that mayor may not have been re­
quired by specifications does not invalidate the 
finding.) Identification tags mentioned on page
15 were also often missing. There were a number 
of instances during the investigation where no 
wire identification of any kind was present to 
permit tracing of circuits. In the question of 
routing wires 'across and along oxygen and water 
glycol l,ines' (item 5 on page 13 of the NAA state­
ment) the statement avoids mention of routing of 
wires 'across' lines, and only justifies routing
of wires along lines 'with secured clearance of 
one-half inch between wires and the hard lines.' 
Many of the other NAA statements may be countered 
in a similar manner. 
"It is believed, however, that any statement by
the Board in countering the NAA response would 
make no significant contribution toward clarifying
the facts of the matter." 
North American has introduced no new significant facts in their 
argument that vibration testing of Block II Spacecraft would 
not be of significant value. Their statement relative to 
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what they term vibration acceptance tests on Spacecraft 009 
refers to a test consisting of vibration of this Spacecraft
for three minutes along the longitudinal axis at a level of 
1 g. Such a test does not replace the purpose of the test 
recommended by the Board. The ground testing of components 
to flight levels, the ground acoustic vibration tests of 
spacecraft elements, and such flight tests that were con­
ducted with Block I Spacecraft are not considered a substi­
tute for the test recommended by the Board. We find no 
basis for changing the Board's Recommendation. 
Floyd L. Thompson 
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Memorandum for Committee on Science and Astronautics 
Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, of the House of Representatives 
This memorandum sets forth the comments of North American Aviation, 
Inc., on the Findings, Determinations, and Recommendations of the Report 
of the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
The comments follow the same numbering system used by the Board in 
its Findings, Determinations, and Recommendations. 
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Before making specific comments, North American believes it important 
to underscore the concern expressed by the Board in its Preface that its 
Report might be interpreted as a criticism of the entire manned space 
flight program and of the many people associated with it. The Board made 
it clear that this was not its intent, pointing out that it was dealing 
with the IImost complex research and development program ever undertaken!! 
and that the Report was not intended to present a total picture of the 
program. 
The Board did find deficiencies, and North American accepts its share 
of responsibility. There have been problems in the developmental phase 
which led to the difficulties described in the Board Report. We believe 
that the Board has done an excellent job of searching these out and 
describing them fully. In assessing the Findings, it must be recognized, 
however, that in space work the standards are and must be extremely high. 
We have always sought improvements and are continually striving for the 
goal of perfection. 
The Apollo Program is indeed a complex program. Great progress has 
been made and many outstanding accomplishments have been achieved. Until 
the time of the aCCident, the spacecraft and their subsystems had a 
highly successful series of ground tests to qualify them for a manned flight 
and there have so far been 13 flight tests of Command and Service Module 
systems, all of them successful. 
We believe it would be a disservice to the many thousands of dedicated 
people who have contributed to this great proje.ct not to remind the 
Committee of past accomplishments and to express the confidence which 
North American has that the Apollo Command and Service Module Program is 
sound, and that a solid basis exists for moving forward to a successful 
completion. 
FllIDING NO.1 
North American concurs with this Finding and with the Determination 
as to the most probable initiator. We have noted the other nine possible 
ignition sources, and on the basis of our participation in the conduct of 
tests and analyses, concur with the Findings that the most probable initiator 
was an electrical are in the sector between -Y and +Z spacecraft axes. 
FllIDING NO. 2a 
North American concurs with Finding 2a that the amount and location 
of combustible materials in the Command Module must be severely restricted 
and controlled. 
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The Mercury and Gemini materials (nonmetallic) testing was limited 
to testing for toxicity and outgassing, and did not include spark 
ignition testing. Therefore, North American initiated the development in 
1963 of criteria for testing the ignition point of individual materials 
in an oxygen environment. These criteria were incorporated into a North 
American specification which was reviewed with NASA. The criteria used 
by North American in this testing was "no ignition below 4000 F in 14.7 pSi, 
100 percent oxygen environment with spark impingement. II Possible materials 
for use in the spacecraft were divided into functional and chemical classes 
and 178 materials representing worst case samples of these classes were 
tested. Of the materials tested, 22 materials and those associated by 
chemical classification were rejected. The approximately 1,800 organic 
materials used in the spacecraft were all measured against the established 
criteria and the results of testing. Limited utilization of materials that 
did not meet these criteria was made on the basis: (a) that a small 
quantity was used, or (b) that there was a minimum exposed surface area, 
and (c) that there was no adjacent ignition source, Or (d) that the material 
was protected from a potential ignition source. 
Notwithstanding this emphasis on the potential problems created 
by combustibles in the spacecraft, it can be seen in retrospect that 
attention was principally directed to individual testing of the material. 
What was not fully understood by either North American or NASA was the 
importance of considering the fire potential of combustibles in a system 
of all materials taken together in the position which they would occupy 
in the spacecraft and in the environment of the spacecraft. 
FIND~G NO. 2b 
North American concurs with Finding No. 2b and the Determination 
and Recommendation. However, see Finding No.5 for our comments on 
IIhazardous test." 
North American has recommended that NASA conduct a feasibility 
study as to the use of air in the Command Module on the launch pad 
instead of 100 percent oxygen. It is recognized that there are a number 
of considerations involved which must be evaluated, such as the design of 
suits and the repressurization of the spacecraft with oxygen while in 
orbit. 
FINDING NO.3 
North American concurs. 
FINDING NO.4· 
North American concurs. The Command Module inner hatch was designed 
with emphasis on reliability and crew operation during space flight. 
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A maximum allowable cabin leak rate of 0.2 pound of oxygen per hour 
resulted in a design utilizing internal pressure to assist in sealing 
the hatch. An important safety factor provided by this design was the 
prevention of inadvertent opening of the hatch in flight. It was 
decided by NASA that the hatch should permit a 90-second egress time 
at pressures up to 0.5 psi above ambient. The hatch on Spacecraft 012 
met this requirement. It was fully recognized that in the event of an 
emergency, egress could not be accomplished until the cabin was depres­
surized, which was to be accomplished by use of a cabin pressure relief 
valve operated manually by the crew, and post-landing vent valves 
for venting cabin pressure after landing. 
In reaching the f\li.)1al decision on the design of the inner hatch, 
many factors were considered, including the need for crew safety during 
lengthy space flights. As pointed out by the Board in its introduction 
to the Findings, once the Command Module has left the earth's environment, 
the occupants are totally dependent upon it for their safety, and design 
features that are intended to reduce the fire risk must not introduce 
other serious risks to mission success and safety. A Wide range of 
considerations did in fact enter into the trade-off studies in the design 
of the spacecraft. At one point, North American did propose a hatch 
which could be opened quickly by use of explosive charges, which was 
intended for crew egress with parachutes prior to landing operations. 
This course was not followed because it was considered by NASA that the 
risk which would be created by an inadvertent opening of the hatch would 
outweigh the benefits. 
North American concurs with the Recommendation of the Board to 
reduce the required egress time and is working with NASA on a new hatch 
design to implement this Recommendation. The new hatch includes a 
clearance around the heat shield which can now be accomplished as a 
result of flight test data from Spacecraft 011 that verifies safety 
during reentry when gaps are included in the ablator. 
FnIDING NO. :2 
North American concurs with this Finding and RecoIllIllendation. We 
wish to point out, however, as noted in the report of Panel No. 13, that 
North American's responsibility for identifying hazardous tasks in the 
preparation of Operational Checkout Procedures is based upon compliance 
with the guidelines and criteria established in the NASA documents 
defining the overall safety program at the Kennedy Space Center which 
includes the procedures concerning the generating and approval of 
hazardous test documents.. These gu.idel.ines and criteria had @volv-ed 
out of previous spacecraft and missile program experience. In 
identifying "hazardOUS" operations, the documents are focused on those 
tests involving fueled vehicles, hypergolic propellants, cryogenic 
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systems, high pressure tanks, live pyrotechnics or altitude chamber 
tests. It can be seen that these criteria did not lead to the identifi­
cation of the spacecraft 012 test as a IIhazardous1! test. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is evident that the criteria were not directed 
to the potential risk involved in the Spacecraft 012 test. We recognize 
that North American might well have questioned them even though it did 
not have the primary responsibility for determining the criteria. 
The balance of this Finding dealing with the matter of contingency 
preparation to permit escape or rescue of the crew relates to NASA 
responsibilities. 
FINDING No.6 
North American concurs with the Determination and Recommendation, 
subject to the following comment. It is understood that the communications 
system problems discussed in this Finding are concerned almost entirely 
with the Ground Communications System, which was not the responsibility 
of North American. The Spacecraft Communication System operated satis­
factorily, with the minor exception of an open microphone condition which 
did not affect the quality or intensity of communications. We are investi­
gating the open microphone proolem, but feel that the Spacecraft Com­
munication System is an effective system, and it did not contribute to 
the accident. 
FINDING NO.7 
North American concurs with this Finding. However, Finding 7b 
requires some clarification. The Ground Test Procedures, in the form 
of Operational Checkout Procedures, were compatible with the In-Flight 
Checklists at the time the revision was made. Thereafter, further 
changes occurred in the In-Flight Checklists at the request of NASA. 
The few variations which existed between the two at the time of the 
initiation of the test have been reviewed and are considered to be 
minor in nature and in no way contributed to the accident. 
However, with respect to the statement that test personnel were 
not adequately familiar with the test procedure, it should be pointed 
out that all North American test engineers were familiar with the 
revised procedure at the time of the accident of Spacecraft 012. 
North American has already discussed with NASA the need for estab­
lishing a period of time, such as 10 days prior to the start of a 
test, to finalize all changes to the In-Flight Checklists, and the need 
to establish a 2-day lead time prior to a test for distribution of test 
procedures. 
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FINDING NO.8 

North American concurs. Full-scale mock-up fire tests are essential 
to the program from a systems point of view. It should not be the 
only basis for testing, however, but should be supplemented by testing 
at a component and/or subsystem level of materials applications as 
configured for installation in the spacecraft and tested in the environ­
ment to which the sp&cecraft is exposed during ground tests and f'lights. 
FINDING NO.9 
That part of this item dealing with combustibles and ful.l-scale 
mock-up tests has been previously commented on. 
With respect to the balance of this item, North American concurs 
in the necessity of conducting studies of the use of a diluent gas, 
and had previously proposed in 1963 that it be authorized to conduct 
studies of this kind. 
FINDmG NO. 10 
In the Board Report and in the underlying Report (Panel No.9) 
the discussion of design, workmanship and quality control relate only 
to certain specific areas of the wiring and to the Environmental 
Control System. North American recognizes the problems which did 
exist in the wiring and the Environmental Contrel System. The basic 
cause of these problems, as discussed in the Panel Report, was that 
the criteria which established the requirements for North American's 
design continued to evolve after the design had been started and in 
fact continued after release of the design to manufacture. We do 
not believe that a basis exists for construing this Finding as an 
indictment of the overall design, workmanship, and quality control 
of the Command Module. 
FINDING NO. lOa 
Environmental Control Systems (ECS) for spacecraft application 
must meet very demanding performance requirements and are extremely 
complex. The ECS systems for all previous manned spacecraft programs 
have experienced developmental problems, the resolution of which was 
difficult and tille-consuming. In the Apollo Program, the requirements 
both for earth orbit and for deep space operations impose new and 
more difficult requirements than previously. In developing this 
system, the developmental subcontractor (the same subcontractor who 
developed the ECS systems for the Mercury and Gemini Programs) has 
encountered problems. 
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Many of the problems were encountered late in the subcontractor1s 
development program. The solution to these problems required modifi­
cations to the equipment installed in Spacecraft 012 which required 
removal and replacement of components in the assembled condition. 
The Environmental Control System for future missions was being improved 
to permit easier installation and maintenance. In addition, the 
improvements will allow some of the te'sts, which were formerly conducted 
in the spacecraft, to be conduc~ed at the manufacturer1s plant, thereby 
reducing the number of removals from the spacecraft. . 
We concur with the Recommendation for a review of the ECS, and 
NASA and North American have conducted such a review. We are confident 
that the corrective measures taken will resolve the problems. 
l:tmuNG NO. lOb 
North American does not concur that coolant leakage at solder 
joints has been a "chronic" problem, although there has been some leakage. 
At the time the decision was made to use solder joints one of the consi­
derations was to use aluminum tubing in order to save weight. The most 
reliable way known to join aluminum tubing was by soldering, taking into 
account experience and data which had been accumulated in aircraft and 
other space programs with respect to the use of welds or B nuts. Solder 
joints have a safety factor of 20 times that of normal working pressure. 
Care had been taken to eliminate stress in solder jOints. It has been 
found that after installation the tubes can be stressed by external 
sources causing "creepll which might result in small leaks. "Armoring" 
and shielding are being designed to strengthen and protect jOints in 
susceptible areas. 
FINDING NO. 10c 
North American believes that a major change involving testing 
and selection of a new coolant is not required in view of the very 
minor combustible properties of the coolant. As the underlying Panel 
Finding points out, no evidence of deleterious corrosion or corrosion 
products was noted in examination of test hardware and in post-flight 
examination of Spacecraft 011. 
We believe that armoring and shielding of the solder joints will 
meet the Board's Recommendation. 
FINDING NO. 10d 
In order to properly respond to this Finding, which is general 
in nature, it is appropriate to consider the specific Findings made 
by the underlying Panel Report (Panel 9) with respect to Spacecraft 012. 
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As to the cited design deficiencies in wiring: 
1. (The in the lower equipment bay was routed through 
narrow channels having many 90-degree bends.) The of the wiring 
in the lower equipment bay was dictated by the IImodular conceptI! approach 
that was used for the equipment. The channel design, as such, is a 
standard practice that is followed for the modular concept, and the 90­
degree bends are necessary due to the compact design. The bends are 
within the minimum design tolerance (4 times the diameter of the 
individual wire) and the corners of the channels are insulated to 
provide additional protection for the wiring around these bends. Recent 
test data on teflon cold flow characteristics is resulting in further 
protection of bends and other pressure points. The reported damage 
to the protective sleevin&which covers the shield on the wire in these 
area~ is not detrimental to the wiring insulation or the circuit functional 
integrity. 
2. (Wire color coding practices were not always adhered to as 
evidenced by the enclosed photograph.) This is an erroneous Finding. 
Multiple conductor cables are identified with a cable identification 
number. Individual wires w'ithin the cable are color coded while they 
remain in cable form. Once the cable terminates and branches out 
as individual conductors, then the connected individual conductors are 
identified by individual wire numbers and the color coding is no longer 
applicable. Some instrumentation components purchased, or delivered 
to us by NASA, have colored wire. The specifications allow them to be 
used as delivered. 
3. (Some areas of wiring showed a dense, disordered array.) This 
Finding refers to appearance and not to the functional integrity of the 
wire. It must be recognized that all of the wiring that connects to the 
Service Module must leave the Command Module structure at a single location 
to eliminate the need for more than one umbilical. These Wires, of 
necessity, come from all areas of the Command Module. The original 
installation of the wiring to these feed-through connectors was orderly 
but due to changes which were ordered after the original installation, 
disarray did occur in some areas. 
This Finding also notes instances of wires being looped back and 
forth to take up the slack. This is a valid wiring practice. In some 
cases excessive lengths of wire had to be stored or looped back into the 
bundle because they were to calibrated resistances for the instrumentation 
functions, and the instrumentation would be affected if these wires were 
not to the calibrated lengths. In other cases due to changes which were 
ordered, equipment was relocated, thereby leaving lengths which could 
either have been cut and spliced or looped. It was considered that loop­
ing was as fully acceptable a practice as cutting and splicing. 
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There is no evidence that the disarray, which resulted from the 
conditions described above, affected the integrity of the wiring or in 
any way attributed to the accident. 
4. (A circuit breaker panel was pressed close to a wire harness.) 
The original design provided sufficient tolerance between close-out panels 
and wire harnesses behind the panels so that touching would not occur. 
Our technicians were instructed not to close out panels if there were 
obstructions or other indications that the wire harnesses may touch the 
panel. Although there is no indication of shorting or arcing in this 
panel, or any evidence that it contributed to the accident, it did indi­
cate insufficient clearances of the wiring after panel installation. 
5. (There were wires routed across and along oxygen and water-glycol 
lines.) Routing of wires along hard lines is acceptable with secured 
clearance of one-half inch between wires and the hard lines. This is a 
standard and acceptable desig~ practice. 
6'0 (The floor wiring and some ctlnnectors in the LEB were not 
completely protected from damage by test personnel and the astronauts.) 
The design of the wire harnesses routing and protection in the Block I 
crew compartment was based upon certain constraints imposed by the com­
bination of weight, lift-to-drag ratio, entry thermal protection for 
the umbilical connection, and the importance of these factors on safety 
and reliability in reentry. 
The unitized couch provides natural protection during flight and 
manned ground testing for that portion of the wire harness under the 
couch. Moreover, while the spacecraft is in orbit there are no weight 
loads imposed by the astronauts. The basic protection for the wire 
harness was tough antichaffing teflon wrap. In addition, during the 
manufacture and check-out of the spacecraft, protective devides in the 
form of work floors and thick padding were used. In the Block II 
spacecraft it was possible, because of a relocation of the umbilical, 
to shorten the wire harness runs and locate them around the sides of the 
floor where they are protected by metal covers. 
As to the cited def,icienc·ies in manufacturing and quality control: 
1. (Lack of attention during manufacturing and/or rework is 
evidenced by foreign objects found in the spacecraft harnesses.) Two 
instances are cited by Panel 9 of foreign objects in the spacecraft 
harnesses. There are no indications, however, in the Board Report that 
these two foreign objects are anything but isolated instances. Such 
instances indicate, however, the great importance of maintaining the 
highest standards of quality of workmanship and inspection. North 
American has recognized that the standards which it has followed in 
its other programs would, adequate though they may have been for these 
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programs, have to be brought as close to perfection as possible for 
manned space work. North American's objective, therefore, has been 
to seek improvements both in the procedures for workmanship and inspection 
and in the means of insuring compliance with them. 
Improved methods of tracking and retrieving tools and equipment 
that could possibly be left in the spacecraft are being instituted and 
a Planned Change Grouping Method has been implemented to accumulate 
and package changes to be installed at specified periods of the manufactur­
. ing and test cycles. These packages of changes are mocked-up, accumulated, 
and approved and delivered at a scheduled time along with a sequential 
quality control approved procedure. 
2. (Some wiring did not have identification tags.) Some wiring 
did not have identification tags, but it should be pointed out that this 
was not an omission. By specification, multiple conductor cables or 
wires carry identification tags. All single conductor wires are numbered. 
So far as we can determine, there is no evidence that identification tags 
were not used at all terminating ends. These methods of identification 
are very satisfactory. 
3. and 4.. (Two Hughes connectors were found to be broken or chipped.) 
This condition on these two connectors might have been caused by improper 
installation, but they could have chipped from thermal shock and sooted 
during the fire. There is no evidence in the Board Report that indicates 
that the connectors were not functioning properly or contributed to the 
accident. 
As to Recommendation lOd, North American had been fabricating wire 
harnesses by three-dimensional method since March 1966. In the manufacture 
of wire harnesses for Block II spacecraft North American utilizes three­
dimensional jigs which accurately represent a dimensionally correct space­
craft and assures that the harnesses will be built exactly to that confi­
guration. Specifications and drawings have been reviewed and in Block II 
are verified by computer and design reviews. As Panel Findings have noted, 
Block II wire harnesses contain flexibility for change and spare wires 
have been provided to allow for If splice areas 11 which provides for ease 
of incorporating changes with least disruption to the basic harness either 
functionally or in appearance. 
FINDJlifG NO. lOe 
As the underlying Panel Report (Panel 2) has pointed out, the 

vibration levels for qualification testing of components were originally 

established on the basis of data from other programs. These data were 

used to define a spectrum of flight vibration levels which would be 

expected along each axis of the spacecraft throughout a frequency range 
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of 20 to 2,000 cycles per second. The components were qualified by 
subjecting them to a random vibration within this frequency range at the 
expected flight level. The length of these tests, 15 minutes along each 
axis, was several times the expected duration of vibratory excitation 
during atmospheric flight. Some component vibration tests were conducted 
using an electromagnetic shaker and the remaining components were tested 
with acoustic excitation. 
Unmanned Spacecraft 009 and 011 were actual flight vehicles which, 
during their suborbital flights, were exposed to boost, orbital and 
entry vibration conditions. Their primary mission was to qualify the 
spacecraft for manned flight, complementing an extensive ground acoustic 
vibration test program which was conducted on representative portions of 
the entire spacecraft and its subsystems. 
North American did conduct vibration acceptance tests on Spacecraft 
009 and, based upon the results, agreed with NASA to stop such tests. 
Structural vibration tests were conducted on Spacecraft 004, and acoustic 
tests were conducted on the lBO-degree sector of the Service Module. 
Because of previous tests of flight configured spacecraft and 
because of the rigorous qualification and acceptance vibration tests 
conducted On subsystems, our view is that vibration testing of a Block 
II spacecraft is not of significant value. 
FllIDING NO. 10f 
With one e~ception the spacecraft design and operating procedures 
do not require the disconnection of electrical connections while 
powered. The one exception was the If cobra aable,1t which is the cable by 
which the crew connects to the spacecraft communication and biomedical 
systems. Special design precautions were taken with respect to this 
cable. These included limiting the current to a value of 25 to 100 
milliamperes by resistors in the circuit leading to the cables. In 
addition, the electrical connection is broken prior to disengagement of 
the protective shell, thus preventing exposure to external material. 
The safe operation of this cable is evidenced by the Panel Report which 
stated that in a simulated separation test neitper arc nor ignition 
was produced. We are, however, studying the possibility of providing 
a switch to deenergize the cable prior to disconnection. 
FllIDING NO. 109 
Preliminary studies for fire protection in the form of fire-fighting 
equipment were made by North American in 1965 and reviewed by NASA. This 
effort was not pursued since it did not appear that feasible fire-fighting 
protection could be designed and installed in the spacecraft. As NASA 
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has explained, additional study and tests are planned to determine whether 
technology can be developed to permit the design of effective. fire-fighting 
equipment. 
FINDING NO. lla 
North American concurs that not all open items were listed in the 
DD250 shipping document that accompanied the spacecraft at the time 
of shipment. However, a revi«:red DD250 was prepared by North American 
and accepted by NASA on September 27, 1966, which documented officially 
the shipped configuration. 
During the preparation of Spacecraft 012 for shipment from Downey, 
North American had agreed with NASA to include at Downey many items 
previously planned for field site installation. Revised planning 
documents were issued calling for the incorporation at Downey of as much 
of this effort as possible prior to shipment. 
Additional emphasis is being placed on compliance with our procedure 
for a 24-hour cut-off time prior to shipment for ,turn-in of records of 
work not completed. This situation related solely to the formalities 
of timely completion of paperwork, and there is no evidence that it 
contributed in any way to the accident. 
FINDING NO. lIb 
North American concurs. Because of the dynamic nature of the test 
program, certain paperwork formalities were not followed. A pretest 
constraints list for this test was prepared, however, and NASA and North 
American Test Conductors did not complete the formality of signing the 
document. A real-time update of the constraints to the test was made by 
a daily coordination meeting held by the Operation Engineers for NASA 
and attended by NASA and North American Systems Engineers. "The Daily 
Status Report, SC 012" was used to e.s,tablish the original constraints 
list and new items that became constraints were scheduled for work during 
these meetings. On the morning of January 27, 1967, items were signed 
off of the original constraints list, and oral agreement was reached 
between NASA and North American that no new constraints had been discovered 
that were not on the original list. There is no evidence to indicate 
that the absence of the appropriate formalities contributed to the 
accident. 
FINDING NO. llc 
It is our understanding that NASA has taken action to resolve this 
situation. This action will aid the definition of the responsibilities 
of the organizations involved. 
G-154 

FINDllfG NO. lld 
Of the 829 equipment items required to be certified for the Command 
Module, only four were not completely certified (i.e., had not completed 
qualification testing) at the time of the accident. In accordance with 
NASA requirements, these four items w'ould have been certified prior to 
flight of the spacecraft. Taking into account. the degree of qualification 
test accomplished on these items, it was considered that these items were 
suitable for pad testing. Insofar as we can determine from the Board 
Report, there has been no evidence that any of these four items related 
in any way to the cause of the accident. The certification or qualifi­
cation testing achieved on the Apollo Program surpasses that achieved on 
any other manned spacecraft program at a comparable time in the develop­
ment program. 
FINDING NO. lle 
North American recognizes that discrepancies did exist between 
specifications which were included into the contract with NASA and a 
new specification which NASA was generating for use with all contractors. 
The North American specification was developed in late 1962 and early 1963 
(and imposed on all of our subcontractors) to limit the use of flammable 
materials in the Command Module. North American and NASA engineers 
conducted a !!walk through!! of Spacecraft 008 and 012 to review the use 
and placement of materials. Another "walk through!! was planned for 
Spacecraft 012 prior to launch. Neither of the specifications, however, 
provided for the system testing of materials which is now considered 
necessary for a full understanding of the hazard potential. 
FINDING NO. llf 
North American concurs with this Finding. The Operational Checkout 
Procedure implementing the specification was prepared at Kennedy Space 
Center by North American personnel. As changes were required in the 
test reqUirements, Downey engineers were sent to Kennedy Space Center 
to provide engineering assistance in the rewrite of the Operational 
Checkout Procedure. The changing test requirements of the test specifi­
cation in many instances was brought about because of constraints in the 
field such as ground support equipment or facilities problems or refine­
ment of test procedures. While the test speCification was not updated, 
the Operational Checkout Procedure actually rep.resented the latest con­
figuration of the test specification as affected by changes. We have 
already instituted action to clarify OUr specification requirements and 
procedures on Block II and remedy this problem. 
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As to the Recommendation under this item, North American concurs 
that every effort must be made to ensure maximum clarification and under­
standing of the responsibilities of all the organizations involved in 
the Apollo Program. It is a program of immense complexity and requires 
the highest degree of organizational skill, both within the government 
and industry, to effectively coordinate the efforts of the hundreds of 
thousands of people who are engaged in Apollo work. 
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CORRESPONDENCE 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058 

IN REPLY REFER TO: PF2.-0!260-67 Jim 1 	9 1. 
TO Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
FROM Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 
SUBJECT: Release of Command Module 014 
Reference: (a) 	 Letter, PP3-67-4!49, dated May 2, 1967, Subject: 
Release of Command Module 014. 
(b) 	 Letter dated May 19, 1967, Subject: Re<;Luest for 
release of Command Module 014. 
Reference (a) re<;Luested that consideration be given to releasing Command 
Module (eM) 014 for use in the Apollo Program. Reference (b), responding 
to this letter, stated that eM 014 was expected to be released before the 
end of May. 
This letter is being written to reiterate the importance of eM 014 to the 
Apollo Program. Currently, we need to remove some additional hardware, 
e. g., guidance and navigation e<;Luipment. 
I would appreciate it if you could release eM 014 as soon as possible. 
G-159 

NATIONAL AERONAU1"'CS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 
JUN 2 1 196r 
MEMORANDUM To 	 Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
Subject: Disposition of Apollo 204 Related Material 
Discussion with the Congressional committees indicates 
no further interest in the Apollo 204 related materials. 
Please proceed 	to process and store the working materials, 
records, films, tapes, Command Module 012, components, 
drawings, space-suits, and other related materials according 
to the procedures established by the Board. 
Dissolution of the Board will be deferred until Congressipnal 
activity related to Apollo 204 is completed and there is 
clearly no further role for the Board. Consequently, the 
Board should stand as appointed, though without active 
assignment, until further advised. 
Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
Deputy Administrator 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
June 22, 1967 
IN REPLY REFER TO 
TO: Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
Kennedy Space Center 
FROM: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: Recision of designation 
By letter dated March 1, 1967, I designated the Manager,
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office as the custodial agent of 
the Spacecraft 012 Command Module, systems, components and 
related drawings. In view of the fact that it has been de­
cided to remove Spacecraft 012 Command Module, etc., from 
Kennedy Space Center to Langley Research Center, the desig­
nation and delegation of authority is hereby rescinded effec­
tive this date. 
Floyd L. Thompson 
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NA TIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
June 22, 1967 
IN REPL Y REFER TO 
TO: Assistant Chief, Administrative 
Services Division, Mail Stop 123 
FROM: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board 
SUBJECT: Designation of custodial agent 
By letter dated March 1, 1967, you were designated custodial 
agent of Category 1, reports, files and working materials of 
the Board. 
In view of the fact that Spacecraft 012 Command Module, its 
systems, components and related drawings are to be permanently
stored at Langley Research Center, you are also designated 
austodial agent of Category 3, Spacecraft 012 Command Module, 
its systems, components and related drawings. 
Floyd L. Thompson 
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NGA664 
PP HOUMSC KSCFLA 
DE NALANG 219 1772045 
ZNR UUUUU 
P 221320Z ,JUN 67 
...... .. lilt 
FM NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER HAl\1PTON VIRGINIA 
TO HOUMSC/NASA ~1ANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON TEXAS 
ATTENTION MR GEORGE M LOW 
INFO KSCFLA/RASPO CODE HS JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA 
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER FLA 
KSCFLA/APOl.LO PROGRAM OFFICE CODE DA JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
NASA KENNEDY SPACE CENTER FLA 
BT 
UNCLAS THIS IS CORRECTED COpy OF DE NALANG 197 1741512 
C0it1t1A~D MODULE MOCK-UP AND CIM 014 ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED BY 
APOLLO 204 REVIFW BOARD AND THEIR DISPOSITION MAY NOW BE 
DE.TERrlINED BY MANAGER, APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE. 
SIGNED FLOYD L. THOMPSON CHAIRMAN APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
BT 
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N~NN 
NGA642 
RR HO~SC KSCFLA 
DE NALANG 198 1741512 
ZNR UUUUU 
R 221.lJ00Z ~.67 
FM NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER HAMPTON VIRGINIA 
TO HOUr~SC/NASA MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON TEXAS 
ATTENTION MR SCOTT H SIMPKINSON 
INFO HOUMSC/MANAGER APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE NASA MANNED 
SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON TEXAS 
KSCFLA/DIRECTOR JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA KENNEDY SPACE 
CENTER FLA 
KSCFLA/APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE CODE DA JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
NASA KENNEDY SPACE CENTER FLA 
KSCFLA/CODE BJ-3 JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA KENNEDY .. SPACE 
CENTER FLA ATTENTION R J REED JR 
KSCFLA/RASPO CODE HS JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA KENNEDY SP 
CENTER FLA 
G-l64 
31 
U~;ctAS 
CONFIF~1P~G "TUNE 20. 1961. TELECON CHAIRMAN AND R. J. REED, JR. 
ALTF.RNATE TO S. BEDDINGFIELD, INTERIM CUSTODIAN OF C/M 012 
DISASSEMBLY. ACTION MAY BE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN TO STORE C/M .012 
PARTS, CC~PONENTS, SYSTEMS IN CONTAINER FOR SHIPMENT TO LANGLEY 
R~SEARCH CENTER. WHEN REMOVED FROM PIS STORAGE AREA, BOARD 
JURISDICTION OF AREA CEASES. 
D~LEGATION OF INTERIM CUSTODIAL. AUTHORITY TO CHAIRMAN, PANEL 4 
R~SCINDED UPON RECEIPT or CIM 012 TO L'RC. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 
TO MANAGER APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE, DATED MARCH 1,
• 
1967 RESCINDED. 
SIGNED FLOYD L. THOMPSON DIRECTOR 
BT 
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- ---
RR NAS~~0 H0UMSC KSCFLA 
DE NALA~G 200 1741511 
FM NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTFR HAMPTON VIRGINIA 
TO NASAHQ/EXPLOSIVF. RESEARCH CENTER BUREAU OF MINES DEPARTMENT OF 
INTERIOR PITTSBURGH PA ATTN DR ROBER WVAN DOLAH 
NASAHQ/CHI~F OF MISSILES AND SPACE SAFETY DIVISION AF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL NORTON AFB CALIF ATTN COL CHARLES F STRANG 
NASAHQ/DIRECTOR RELIABILITY AND QUALITY APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE 
NASA HEADQUARTERS WASH DC ATTN MR GEORGE C WHITE JR 
HOUMSC/N;~SA 11 ANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER HOUSTON TEXAS 
ATTN COL FRANK BORMAN USAF ASTRONAUT 
HOUMSC/DIRECTOR ENG! NEERING AND DEVELOPMENT NASA MANNED SPACECRAFT 
CENTER HOUSTON TEXAS ATTN DR MAXIME A FAGET 
KSCFLA/OIRECTOR SPACECRAFT OPERATIONS JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
NASA KENNEDY SPACE CENTER FLA ATTN MR JOHN J wItLIAMS 
BT 
UNCLAS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR 
JUNE 20, 1957, DISPOSITION OF C/M 012 WAS EFFECTED BY FOLLOWING 
TtlX TO COGNIZANT KSC AND MSC PERSONNEL: 
"CONFIRt~ING JUNE 20, 1967, TELECON CHAIRMAN AND R. J. REED, 
JR. ALTERNATE-TO S. BEDDINGFIELD, INTERIM CUSTODIAN OF elM 012 
DISI\SSI':'~~8LY. ACTIO~~ [<tAY BE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN TO STORE C/M (JI12 
PARTS, CCr'lPONENTS, SYSTEMS IN CONTAINER FOR SHIPMENT TO lANGLEY 
RESEARCH CENTER. WHf.N REMOVED FROM PIB STORAGE AREA, BOARD 
JURISDICTION OF AREA CEASES. 
PAG~ 2 NALANG 200 UNCLAS 
DELEGATION OF INTERIM CUSTODIAL AUTHORITY TO CHAIRMAN, PANEL 4 
RESCINDED UPON RECEIPT OF CIM ~1~ TO LRC. DELEGATION OF 
AUTHORITY TO MANGER APOLLO S?ACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE, DATED 
MARCH 1, 1967~ RESCINDED.­
BOARD WILL NOT BE DISSOLVED UNTIL ADMINISTRATOR SATISFIED THAT ALL 
HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS ARE COMPLETED. WILL ADV·ISE 
WHEN DISSOLUTION EFFECTED. 
SIGNED Fl.OYD L. THOMPSON CHAIRMAN APOLLO 204 REV.IEW BOARD 
BT 
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f:R KSCFLA 
ct NALANG 199 1741511 
t:NR UUUU.U 
R 2314402 JUN 67 
....""". ­
FM NASA LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER HAMPTON VIRGINIA 
TO KSCFl.,\/DI RECTOR JOHN F KENNEDY SPACE CENTER NASA KENNEDY SPACE 
CENTER FLA 
INFO KSCFLA/APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE CODE DA JOHN F KENNEDY'SPACE 
CENTER NASA KENNEDY SPACE CENTER FtA 
BT 
UNCLAS 
ACTION TAKEN THIS DATE AS PER INFORMATION COpy FURNISHED YOUR 
OFFICE TO STORE cnt012 PARTS, COMPONENTS, lTC. FOR SHIPfIf£NT TO tRe. 
LETTER FOLLOWS REGARDING ·DISPOSITION APOLLO 204 RELATED MATERIALS 
AN~ RELEASE OF FURlHER RESPONSIBILITY OF KSC. 
SIGNED FLOYD L. THOMPSON D, CHAIRMAN, APOLL.O 204 REVIEW BOARD 
BT 
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Jae 23, 1967 
'to: 
All ,.. kaoIr. the PU ",091'" .tor....... foe tM OG.,oaeat.

.... .,..t_ of Ceu..... 1Ioda1. OU. 10 ..utioa • Ca .Dd 
....1. .oclt-., .... ca..... 1IIMIul. 014 .... h..... ia tbat 
1Ma11d1Da. 
I hav. thi. dac. .eat 'lB.'. _thOl'lal.. the r ••oval of elK 
012 .y.t_ ... C~Dt. f_ ,.1"111....t .tor,......h1,..Dt 
to Laaal.,. ....... 'c..e_ la aceorAacO with Dttl.'UCtlou 

rec.lv.d froa th.e Depaty Adwdal.t....ator. I al.o haw &IIthor-
1.M the ...._, Apollo 'paceC1'aft PrOl""- Office to take 
.ucb .t.,. .. Dec••.ary to .ffect d1.ponltloa of tbe .ack­
up aDd Co._" 1Io4ul. 014. 
I _ fund..hiDa chi. lDfor.atlOil to yO\l .0 that the Pla can 
be ... a.l1&61. to Ie.My Spac. Cut.r .. .OOD a. poaalble 
for ...-l. ope'l'atlou. 
Upon c-.1.tl08 of thi. actlOD, lt it &Iltlcl,at.d that the 
Board viii DO 1ona.r aeed to call OIl KeD... Spac. C.at.r for 
further ...utaac.. Bow....r. uatU tb.eBoara 1. f--l11 dl.­
.ol..ecl bJ the Adlainut....ator, ooatlaueci 11&1.08 with IeDDedJ 
Spac. Coater tbrouah Hr. Iraa.e Iwieda, bee..tl... ho.....tary
of the Board, would be ••1Abl. ed 111••• 
Ita,. I ODee apia apr••• ., appr.clatlon, and OD b.half of tb. 
other Board .....1'. their .pproelatlOD, for Jour klad ...1.­
t&DCO and cooperatlOD. 
noyd L. Tb.,'OD 
GT.Malley:scw 6-23-67 
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